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Abstract
We consider the problem of implementing two-party interactive quantum communication
over noisy channels, a necessary endeavor if we wish to fully reap quantum advantages for
communication. For an arbitrary protocol with n messages, designed for a noiseless qudit
channel over a poly (n) size alphabet, our main result is a simulation method that fails with
probability less than 2−Θ(n) and uses a qudit channel over the same alphabet n(1 + Θ(
√
))
times, of which an  fraction can be corrupted adversarially. The simulation is thus capacity
achieving to leading order, and we conjecture that it is optimal up to a constant factor in the
√

term. Furthermore, the simulation is in a model that does not require pre-shared resources such
as randomness or entanglement between the communicating parties. Our work improves over
the best previously known quantum result where the overhead is a non-explicit large constant
[Brassard et al., FOCS’14] for low .
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 The main questions.
Quantum communication offers the possibility of distributed computation with extraordinary prov-
able savings in communication as compared with classical communication (see, e.g., [RK11] and
the references therein). Most often, if not always, the savings are achieved by protocols that as-
sume access to noiseless communication channels. In practice, though, imperfection in channels is
inevitable. Is it possible to make the protocols robust to noise while maintaining the advantages
offered by quantum communication? If so, what is the cost of making the protocols robust, and how
much noise can be tolerated? In this article, we address these questions in the context of quantum
communication protocols involving two parties, in the low noise regime. Following convention, we
call the two parties Alice and Bob.
1.1.2 Channel coding theory as a special case.
In the special case when the communication is one-way (say, from Alice to Bob), techniques for
making the message noise-tolerant, via error correcting codes, have been studied for a long time.
Coding allows us to simulate a noiseless communication protocol using a noisy channel, under
certain assumptions about the noise process (such as having a memoryless channel). Typically,
such simulation is possible when the error rate (the fraction of the messages corrupted) is lower
than a certain threshold. A desirable goal is to also maximize the communication rate (also called
the information rate), which is the length of the original message, as a fraction of the length of its
encoding. In the classical setting, Shannon established the capacity (i.e., the optimal communication
rate) of arbitrarily accurate transmission, in the limit of asymptotically large number of channel
uses, through the Noisy Coding Theorem [Sha48]. Since then, researchers have discovered many
explicit codes with desirable properties such as good rate, and efficient encoding and decoding
procedures (see, for example, [Sto02, Ari09]). Analogous results have been developed over the
past two decades in the quantum setting. In particular, capacity expressions for a quantum
channel transmitting classical data [Hol98, SW97] or quantum data [Llo97, Sho02, Dev05] have been
derived. Even though it is not known how we may evaluate these capacity expressions for a general
quantum channel, useful error correcting codes have been developed for many channels of interest
(see, for example, [CS96, CRSS97, BDSW96, Bom15]). Remarkably, quantum effects give rise to
surprising phenomena without classical counterparts, including superadditivity [DSS98, Has09], and
superactivation [SY08]. All of these highlight the non-trivial nature of coding for noisy quantum
channels.
1.1.3 Communication complexity as a special case.
In general two-party protocols, data are transmitted in each direction alternately, potentially over
a number of rounds. In a computation problem, the number of rounds may grow as a function
of the input size. Such protocols are at the core of several important areas including distributed
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computation, cryptography, interactive proof systems, and communication complexity. For example,
in the case of the Disjointness function, a canonical task in the two-party communication model, an
n-bit input is given to each party, who jointly compute the function with as little communication as
possible. The optimal quantum protocol for this task consists of Θ (
√
n ) rounds of communication,
each with a constant length message [BCW98, HDW02, AA03], and such a high level of interaction
has been shown to be necessary [KNTZ07, JRS03, BGK+15]. Furthermore, quantum communication
leads to provable advantages over the classical setting, without any complexity-theoretic assumptions.
For example, some specially crafted problems (see, for example, [Raz99, RK11]) exhibit exponential
quantum advantages, and others display the power of quantum interaction by showing that just
one additional round can sometimes lead to exponential savings [KNTZ07].
1.1.4 The problem, and motivation for the investigation.
In this paper, we consider two-party interactive communication protocols using noisy communication.
The goal is to effectively implement an interactive communication protocol to arbitrary accuracy
despite noise in the available channels. We want to minimize the number of uses of the noisy
channel, and the complexity of the coding operations. The motivation is two-fold and applies
to both the classical and the quantum setting. First, this problem is a natural generalization of
channel coding from the 1-way to the 2-way setting, with the “capacity” being the best ratio of the
number of channel uses in the original protocol divided by that needed in the noisy implementation.
Here, we consider the combined number of channel uses in both directions. Note that this scenario
is different from “assisted capacities” where some auxiliary noiseless resources such as a classical
side channel for quantum transmission are given to the parties for free. Second, we would like
to generalize interactive protocols to the noisy communication regime. If an interactive protocol
can be implemented using noisy channels while preserving the complexity, then the corresponding
communication complexity results become robust against channel noise. In particular, an important
motivation is to investigate whether the quantum advantage in interactive communication protocols
is robust against quantum noise. Due to the ubiquitous nature of quantum noise and fragility
of quantum data, noise-resilience is of fundamental importance for the realization of quantum
communication networks. The coding problem for interactive quantum communication was first
studied in [BNT+19]. In Section 1.3, we elaborate on this work and the questions that arise from
it.
1.2 Fundamental difficulties in coding for quantum interactive communication
For some natural problems the optimal interactive protocols require a lot of interaction. For example,
distributed quantum search over n items [BCW98, HDW02, AA03] requires Θ (
√
n) rounds of
constant-sized messages [KNTZ07, JRS03, BGK+15]. How can we implement such highly interactive
protocols over noisy channels? What are the major obstacles?
1.2.1 Standard error correcting codes are inapplicable.
In both the classical and quantum settings, standard error correcting codes are inapplicable. To see
this, first suppose we encode each message separately. Then the corruption of even a single encoded
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message can already derail the rest of the protocol. Thus, for the entire protocol to be simulated
with high fidelity, we need to reduce the decoding error for each message to be inversely proportional
to the length of the protocol, say n. For constant size messages, the overhead of coding then grows
with the problem size n, increasing the complexity and suppressing the rate of simulation to 0
as n increases. The situation is even worse with adversarial errors: the adversary can invest the
entire error budget to corrupt the shortest critical message, and it is impossible to tolerate an error
rate above ≈ 1/number of rounds, no matter what the rate of communication is. To circumvent
this barrier, one must employ a coding strategy acting collectively over many messages. However,
most of these are generated dynamically during the protocol and are unknown to the sender earlier.
Furthermore, error correction or detection may require communication between the parties, which
is also corruptible. The problem is thus reminiscent of fault-tolerant computation in that the steps
needed to implement error correction are themselves subject to errors.
1.2.2 The no-cloning quantum problem.
A fundamental property of quantum mechanics is that learning about an unknown quantum state
from a given specimen disturbs the state [BBJ+94]. In particular, an unknown quantum state
cannot be cloned [Die82, WZ82]. This affects our problem in two fundamental ways. First, any
logical quantum data leaked into the environment due to the noisy channel cannot be recovered by
the communicating parties. Second, the parties hold a joint quantum state that evolves with the
protocol, but they cannot make copies of the joint state without corrupting it.
1.3 Prior classical and quantum work
Despite the difficulties in coding for interactive communication, many interesting results have been
discovered over the last 25 years, with a notable extension in the quantum setting.
1.3.1 Classical results showing positive rates.
Schulman first raised the question of simulating noiseless interactive communication protocols using
noisy channels in the classical setting [Sch92, Sch93, Sch96]. He developed tree codes to work with
messages that are determined one at a time, and generated dynamically during the course of the
interaction. These codes have constant overhead, and the capacity is thus a positive constant.
Furthermore, these codes protect data against adversarial noise that corrupts up to a 1240 fraction
of the channel uses. This tolerable noise rate was improved by subsequent work, culminating to the
results by Braverman and Rao [BR14]. They showed that < 14 adversarial errors can be tolerated
provided one can use large constant alphabet sizes and that this bound on noise rate is optimal.
1.3.2 Classical results with efficient encoding and decoding.
The aforementioned coding schemes are not known to be computationally efficient, as they are
built on tree codes; the computational complexity of encoding and decoding tree codes is unknown.
Other computationally efficient encoding schemes have been developed [BK12, BN13, BKN14,
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GMS11, GMS14, GH14]. The communication rates under various scenarios have also been studied
[BE17, GHS14, EGH15, FGOS15]. However, the rates do not approach the capacity expected of
the noise rate.
1.3.3 Classical results with optimal rates.
Kol and Raz [KR13] first established coding with rate approaching 1 as the noise parameter
goes to 0, for the binary symmetric channel. Haeupler [Hae14] extended the above result to
adversarial binary channels corrupting at most an  fraction of the symbols, with communication rate
1−O
(√
 log log
(
1

))
, which is conjectured to be optimal. For oblivious adversaries, this increases
to 1−O(√). Further studies of capacity have been conducted, for example, in [HV17, ABY17]. For
further details about recent results on interactive coding, see the extensive survey by Gelles [G+17].
1.3.4 Quantum results showing positive rates.
All coding for classical interactive protocols relies on “backtracking”: if an error is detected, the
parties go back to an earlier stage of the protocol and resume from there. Backtracking is impossible
in the quantum setting due to the no cloning principle described in the previous subsection. There is
no generic way to make copies of the quantum state at earlier stages without restarting the protocol.
Brassard, Nayak, Tapp, Touchette, and Unger [BNT+19] provided the first coding scheme with
constant overhead by using two ideas. The first idea is to teleport each quantum message. This
splits the quantum data into a protected quantum share and an unprotected classical share that
is transmitted through the noisy channels using tree codes. Second, backtracking is replaced by
reversing of steps to return to a desirable earlier stage; i.e., the joint quantum state is evolved back
to that of an earlier stage, which circumvents the no-cloning theorem. This is possible since local
operations can be made unitary, and communication can be reversed (up to more noise). Together,
a positive simulation rate (or constant overhead) can be achieved. In the noisy analogue to the
Cleve-Buhrman communication model where entanglement is free, error rate < 12 can be tolerated.
In the noisy analogue to the Yao (plain) model, a noisy quantum channel with one-way quantum
capacity Q > 0 can be used to simulate an n-message protocol given O
(
1
Qn
)
uses. However, the
rate can be suboptimal and the coding complexity is unknown due to the use of tree codes. The
rate is further reduced by a large constant in order to match the quantum and classical data in
teleportation, and in coordinating the action of the parties (advancing or reversing the protocol).
1.4 Results in this paper, overview of techniques, and our contributions
Inspired by the recent results on rate optimal coding for the classical setting [KR13, Hae14] and
the rate suboptimal coding in the quantum setting [BNT+19], a fundamental question is: can we
likewise avoid the loss of communication rate for interactive quantum protocols? In particular,
is it possible to protect quantum data without pre-shared free entanglement, and if we have to
generate it at a cost, can we still achieve rate approaching 1 as the error rate vanishes? Further,
can erroneous steps be reversed with noisy resources, and with negligible overhead as the error rate
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vanishes? What is the complexity of rate optimal protocols, if one exists? Are there other new
obstacles?
To address all these questions, in this paper we start by studying a simpler setting where the input
protocol Π and the noisy communication channel operate on the same communication alphabet
of polynomial size in the length of Π. This simplifies the algorithm while still capturing the main
challenges we need to address. The analysis is easier to follow and shares the same outline and
structure with our main result, namely simulation of noiseless interactive communication over
constant-size alphabets, which we will present in an upcoming paper. The framework we develop in
this work, sets the stage for a smooth transition to the small alphabet case. We focus on alternating
protocols, in which Alice and Bob exchange qudits back and forth in alternation. Our main result
in this paper is the following:
Theorem 1.1. Consider any alternating communication protocol Π in the plain quantum model,
communicating n messages over a noiseless channel with an alphabet Σ of bit-size Θ (logn). We
provide a simulation protocol Π′ which given Π, simulates it with probability at least 1−2−Θ(n), over
any fully adversarial error quantum channel with alphabet Σ and error rate . The simulation uses
n (1 + Θ (
√
)) rounds of communication, and therefore achieves a communication rate of 1−Θ (√).
Our rate optimal protocol requires a careful combination of ideas to overcome various obstacles.
Some of these ideas are well-established, some are not so well known, some require significant
modifications, and some are new. A priori, it is not clear whether these previously developed
tools would be useful in the context of the problem. For the clarity of presentation, we first
introduce our main ideas in a simpler communication model, where Alice and Bob have access to
free entanglement and communicate over a fully adversarial error classical channel. We introduce
several key ideas while developing a basic solution to approach the optimal rate in this scenario.
Inspired by [BNT+19], we use teleportation to protect the communication and the simulation is
actively rewound whenever an error is detected. We develop a framework which allows the two
parties to obtain a global view of the simulation by locally maintaining a classical data structure.
We adapt ideas due to Haeupler [Hae14] to efficiently update this data structure over the noisy
channel and evolve the simulation. Then, we extend these ideas to the plain model of quantum
communication with large alphabet size. In the plain quantum model, Alice and Bob communicate
over a fully adversarial error quantum channel and do not have access to any pre-shared resources
such as entanglement or shared randomness. As a result any such resources need to be established
through extra communication. This in particular makes it more challenging to achieve a high
communication rate in this setting. Surprisingly, an adaptation of an old technique called the
Quantum Vernam Cipher (QVC) [Leu02] turns out to be the perfect method to protect quantum
data in our application. QVC allows the two parties to recycle and reuse entanglement as needed
throughout the simulation. Building on the ideas introduced in the teleportation-based protocol, one
of our main contributions in this model is developing a mechanism to reliably recycle entanglement
in a communication efficient way.
5
2 Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with the quantum formalism for finite dimensional systems; for
a thorough treatment, we refer the interested reader to good introductions in a quantum information
theory context [NC00, Chapter 2], [Wat16, Chapter 2] [Wil13, Chapters 3, 4, 5].
Let A be a d-dimensional Hilbert space with computational basis {|0〉 , . . . , |d− 1〉}. Let X and Z be
the operators such that X |k〉 def= |k + 1〉 and Z |k〉 def= ei·2pi kd |k〉. The generalized Pauli operators, also
known as the Heisenberg-Weyl operators, are defined as
{
XjZk
}
0≤j,k≤d−1. Let Σ = {0, . . . , d− 1}.
For N ∈ N, the operators in
Pd,N def= {Xj1Zk1 ⊗ · · · ⊗XjNZkN }jlkl∈Σ2,l∈[N ] (1)
form a basis for the space of operators on A⊗N . For E ∈ Pd,N , We denote by wt (E) the weight
of E, i.e., the number of A subsystems on which E acts non-trivially. For j, k ∈ Σ, we represent
the single qudit Pauli error XjZk by the string jk ∈ Σ2. Similarly, a Pauli error on multiple qudits
is represented by a string in
(
Σ2
)∗. The Fourier transform operator F is defined to be the operator
such that F |j〉 def= 1√
d
∑d−1
k=0 e
i·2pi jk
d |k〉.
Proposition 2.1. Let
{
XjZk
}
0≤j,k≤d−1 be the set of generalized Pauli operators on a d-dimensional
Hilbert space. It holds that XjZk = e−i·2pi
jk
d ZkXj , FXjF † = Zj and FZjF † = Xj for every j, k ∈
{|0〉 , . . . , |d− 1〉}.
Definition 2.2. Let A,B be d-dimensional Hilbert spaces with computational bases {|i〉A}0≤i≤d−1
and {|i〉B}0≤i≤d−1, respectively. The set of Bell states in A⊗ B is defined as{∣∣∣φj,k〉
AB
def=
(
XjAZ
k
A ⊗ 1
)
|φ〉AB : 0 ≤ j, k ≤ d− 1
}
,
where |φ〉AB def= 1√d
∑d−1
i=0 |i〉A |i〉B. For j, k ∈ Z, we define
∣∣∣φj,k〉 def= ∣∣∣φj mod d,k mod d〉.
It is easy to see that
∣∣∣φj,k〉 = 1√
d
∑d−1
t=0 e
i·2pi tk
d |t+ j, t〉.
Proposition 2.3. The Bell states
{∣∣∣φj,k〉}
0≤j,k≤d−1 form an orthonormal basis in A⊗ B.
Proposition 2.4. For any unitary operator U on register A, it holds that
(U ⊗ 1) |φ〉AB = (1⊗ UT ) |φ〉AB ,
where UT = ∑j,k 〈j|U |k〉 |k〉〈j|. In particular, (F ⊗ 1) |φ〉AB = (1⊗ F ) |φ〉AB.
2.1 Quantum Communication Model
The definitions for the noiseless and noisy quantum communication models are copied from
Ref. [BNT+19]. We refer the reader there for a more formal definition of the noisy quantum
communication model, as well as the relationship of the noiseless quantum communication model to
well-studied quantum communication complexity models such a Yao’s model and the Cleve-Buhrman
model.
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2.1.1 Noiseless Communication Model
In the noiseless quantum communication model that we want to simulate, there are five quantum
registers: the A register held by Alice, the B register held by Bob, the C register, which is the
communication register exchanged back-and-forth between Alice and Bob and initially held by
Alice, the E register held by a potential adversary Eve, and finally the R register, a reference
system which purifies the state of the ABCE registers throughout the protocol. The initial state
|ψinit〉ABCER ∈ H(A⊗B ⊗ C ⊗ E ⊗R) is chosen arbitrarily from the set of possible inputs, and is
fixed at the outset of the protocol, but possibly unknown (totally or partially) to Alice and Bob.
Note that to allow for composition of quantum protocols in an arbitrary environment, we consider
arbitrary quantum states as input, which may be entangled with systems RE. A protocol Π is then
defined by the sequence of unitary operations U1, U2, · · · , Un+1, with Ui for odd i known at least
to Alice (or given to her in a black box) and acting on registers AC, and Ui for even i known at
least to Bob (or given to him in a black box) and acting on registers BC. For simplicity, we assume
that n is even. We can modify any protocol to satisfy this property, while increasing the total
cost of communication by at most one communication of the C register. The unitary operators of
protocol Π can be assumed to be public information, known to Eve. On a particular input state
|ψinit〉, the protocol generates the final state |ψfinal〉ABCER = Un+1 · · ·U1 |ψinit〉ABCER, for which at
the end of the protocol the A and C registers are held by Alice, the B register is held by Bob, and
the E register is held by Eve. The reference register R is left untouched throughout the protocol.
The output of the protocol resides in systems ABC, i.e., Π(|ψinit〉) = TrER
(
|ψfinal〉〈ψfinal|ABCER
)
,
and by a slight abuse of notation we also represent the induced quantum channel from ABCE
to ABC simply by Π. This is depicted in Figure 1. Note that while the protocol only acts on
ABC, we wish to maintain correlations with the reference system R, while we simply disregard
what happens on the E system assumed to be in Eve’s hand. Since we consider local computation
to be free, the sizes of A and B can be arbitrarily large, but still of finite size, say mA and mB
qubits, respectively. Since we are interested in high communication rate, we do not want to restrict
ourselves to the case of a single-qubit communication register C, since converting a general protocol
to one of this form can incur a factor of two overhead. We thus consider alternating protocols in
which the register C is of fixed size, say d dimensions, and is exchanged back-and-forth. We believe
that non-alternating protocols can also be simulated by adapting our techniques, but we leave this
extension to future work. Note that both the Yao and the Cleve-Buhrman models of quantum
communication complexity can be recast in this framework; see Ref. [BNT+19].
We later embed length n protocols into others of larger length n′ > n. To perform such noiseless
protocol embedding, we define some dummy registers A˜, B˜, C˜ isomorphic to A, B, C, respectively.
A˜ and C˜ are part of Alice’s scratch register and B˜ is part of Bob’s scratch register. Then, for
any isomorphic quantum registers D, D˜, let SWAPD↔D˜ denote the unitary operation that swaps
the D, D˜ registers. Recall that n is assumed to be even. In a noiseless protocol embedding,
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · ·n − 1}, we leave Ui untouched. We replace Un by (SWAPB↔B˜Un) and Un+1 by
(SWAPAC↔A˜C˜Un+1). Finally, for i ∈ {n+2, n+3, · · ·n′+1}, we define Ui = I, the identity operator.
This embedding is important in the setting of interactive quantum coding for the following reasons.
First, adding these Ui for i > n makes the protocol well defined for n′+1 steps. Then, swapping the
important registers into the safe registers A˜, B˜, C˜ ensures that the important registers are never
affected by noise arising after the first n+ 1 steps have been applied. Hence, in our simulation, as
long as we succeed in implementing the first n+ 1 steps without errors, the simulation will succeed
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Figure 1: Depiction of a quantum protocol in the noiseless communication model.
since the A˜, B˜, C˜ registers will then contain the output of the simulation, with no error acting on
these registers.
2.1.2 Noisy Communication Model
There are many possible models for noisy communication. For our main results, we focus on
one in particular, analogous to the Yao model with no shared entanglement but noisy quantum
communication, which we call the plain quantum model. In Section 3, we consider and define an
alternative model.
For simplicity, we formally define in this section what we sometimes refer to as alternating com-
munication models, in which Alice and Bob take turns in transmitting the communication register
to each other, and this is the model in which most of our protocols are defined. Our definitions
easily adapt to somewhat more general models which we call oblivious communication models,
following Ref. [BR14]. In these models, Alice and Bob do not necessarily transmit their messages
in alternation, but nevertheless in a fixed order and of fixed sizes known to all (Alice, Bob and Eve)
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depending only on the round, and not on the particular input or the actions of Eve. Communication
models with a dependence on inputs or actions of Eve are called adaptive communication models.
Plain Quantum Model In the plain quantum model, Alice has workspace A′, Bob has workspace
B′, the adversary Eve has workspace E′, and there is some quantum communication register C ′ of
some fixed size d′ dimensions (we will consider only d′ = d in this work), exchanged back and forth
between them n′ times, passing through Eve’s hand each time. Alice and Bob can perform arbitrary
local processing between each transmission, whereas Eve’s processing when the C ′ register passes
through her hand is limited by the noise model as described below. The input registers ABCE
are shared between Alice (AC), Bob (B) and Eve (E) and the output registers A˜B˜C˜ are shared
between Alice (A˜C˜) and Bob (B˜). The reference register R containing the purification of the input
is left untouched throughout. Alice and Bob also possess registers CA and CB, respectively, acting
as virtual communication register C from the original protocol Π of length n to be simulated. The
communication rate of the simulation is given by the ratio n log dn′ log d′ .
We are interested in two models of errors, adversarial and random noise. In the adversarial noise
model, we are mainly interested in an adversary Eve with a bound δn′ on the number of errors
that she introduces on the quantum communication register C ′ that passes through her hand.
The fraction δ of corrupted transmissions is called the error rate. More formally, an adversary
in the quantum model with error rate bounded by δ ∈ [0, 1] is specified by a sequence of instru-
ments NE′C′11 , . . . ,N
E′C′
n′
n′ acting on register E′ of arbitrary dimension d′′ and the communication
register C ′ of dimension d′ in protocols of length n′. For any density operator ρ on H(E′ ⊗ C ′⊗n′),
the action of such an adversary is
NE′C′11 · · · N
E′C′
n′
n′ (ρ) =
∑
i
GiρG
†
i , (2)
for i ranging over some finite set, subject to ∑iG†iGi = 1E′C′⊗n′ , where each Gi is of the form
Gi =
∑
F∈Pd′′,1
∑
H∈Pd′,n′
wt(H)≤δn′
αiF,HF
E′ ⊗HC′⊗n
′
. (3)
In the random noise model, we consider n′ independent and identically distributed uses of a noisy
quantum channel acting on register C ′, half the time in each direction. Eve’s workspace register
E′ (including her input register E) can be taken to be trivial in this noise model. Note that the
adversarial noise model includes the random noise model as a special case.
For both noise models, we say that the simulation succeeds with error  if for any input, the output
in register A˜B˜C˜ corresponds to that of running protocol Π on the same input, while also maintaining
correlations with system R, up to error  in trace distance.
Note that adversaries in the quantum model can inject fully quantum errors since the messages
are quantum, in contrast to adversaries corrupting classical messages which are restricted to be
modifications of classical symbols. On the other hand, for classical messages the adversary can read
all the messages without the risk of corrupting them, whereas in the quantum model, any attempt
to “read” messages will result in an error in general on some quantum message.
9
2.2 Entanglement distribution
In our algorithm in the plain quantum model, Alice and Bob need to use MESs as a resource in
order to simulate the input protocol. To establish the shared MESs, one party creates the states
locally and sends half of each MES to the other party using an appropriate error correcting code of
distance 4n, as described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Robust Entanglement Distribution(`)
Input: ` (desired number of MESs)
1 C ← Error Correcting Code with rate 1−Θ(H()) guaranteed by quantum
Gilbert-Varshamov bound [FM04];
2 if Alice then
3 Prepare ` MESs in registers A,B′ each holding half of every MES;
4 Transmit C (B′) to Bob;
5 else if Bob then
6 Receive C ′(B′);
7 Decode C ′(B′) into register B;
8 return Robust Entanglement Distribution;
2.3 Hashing for string comparison
We use randomized hashes to compare strings and catch disagreements probabilistically. The hash
values can be viewed as summaries of the strings to be compared. A random bit string called the
seed is used to select a function from the family of hash functions. We say a hash collision occurs
when a hash function outputs the same value for two unequal strings. In this paper we use the
following family of hash functions based on the -biased probability spaces constructed in [NN93].
Lemma 2.5 (from [NN93]). For any l, any alphabet Σ, and any probability 0 < p < 1, there exist
s = Θ(log(l log |Σ|) + log 1p), o = Θ(log 1p), and a simple function h, which given an s-bit uniformly
random seed S maps any string over Σ of length at most l into an o-bit output, such that the collision
probability of any two l-symbol strings over Σ is at most p. In short:
∀l,Σ, 0 < p < 1 : ∃s = Θ(log(l log |Σ|) + log 1
p
) , o = Θ(log 1
p
) , h : {0, 1}s × Σ≤l 7→ {0, 1}o s.t.
∀X, Y ∈ Σ≤l, X 6= Y, S ∈ {0, 1}s i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2) : P [hS(X) = hS(Y)] ≤ p
In our application, the hash family of Lemma 2.5 is used to compare Θ (n)-bit strings, where n is
the length of the input protocol. Therefore, in the large alphabet setting, the collision probability
can be chosen to be as low as p = 1/poly (n), while still allowing the hash values to be exchanged
using only a constant number of symbols. In the teleportation-based model, where Alice and Bob
have access to free pre-shared entanglement, they generate the seeds by measuring the MESs they
share in the computational basis. In our simulation protocol in the plain quantum model, where
Alice and Bob do not start with pre-shared entanglement, they use Algorithm 1 at the outset of
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the simulation to distribute the MESs they need for the simulation. A fraction of these MESs are
measured by both parties to obtain the seeds.
One advantage of generating the seeds in this way is that the seeds are unknown to the adversary.
This is in contrast to the corresponding classical model with no pre-shared randomness, were the
seeds need to be communicated over the classical channel and the adversary gets to know the seeds.
The knowledge of the seeds enables the adversary to introduce errors which remain undetected
with certainty. As a result, Haeupler [Hae14] adds another layer of hashing to his algorithm for
the oblivious noise model to protect against fully adversarial noise, dropping the simulation rate
from 1−Θ (√) to 1−Θ
(√
 log log 1/
)
.
2.4 Extending randomness to pseudo-randomness
In our simulation algorithm in the plain quantum model, Alice and Bob need to share a very long
random string which they need to establish through communication. A direct approach would be
for them to distribute enough MESs and measure them in the computational basis to obtain a
uniformly random shared string. However, this would lead to a vanishing simulation rate. Instead,
they distribute a much shorter i.i.d. random bit string R′ and using Lemma 2.10 below stretch it to
a pseudo-random string R of the desired length which is statistically indistinguishable from being
independent. Before stating Lemma 2.10, we need the following definitions and propositions.
Definition 2.6. Let X be a random variable distributed over {0, 1}n and J ⊆ [n] be a non-empty
set. The bias of J with respect to distribution X, denoted biasJ (X), is defined as
biasJ (X)
def=
∣∣∣∣∣Pr
(∑
i∈J
Xi = 1
)
− Pr
(∑
i∈J
Xi = 0
)∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where the summation is mod 2. For J = ∅, bias is defined to be zero, i.e., bias∅ (X) = 0.
Definition 2.7. Let δ ∈ [0, 1]. A distribution X over {0, 1}n is called a δ-biased sample space if
biasJ (X) ≤ δ, for all non-empty subsets J ⊆ [n].
Intuitively, a small-bias random variable is statistically close to being uniformly distributed. The
following lemma quantifies this statement.
Proposition 2.8. Let X be an arbitrary distribution over {0, 1}n and let U denote the uniform
distribution over {0, 1}n. Then we have
‖X − U‖22 ≤ 2−n
∑
J⊆[n]
bias2J (X) .
In particular, for δ-biased x we have ‖X − U‖2 ≤ δ.
We will make use of the following proposition providing an alternative characterization of the
L1-distance between two probability distributions.
Proposition 2.9. Let p and q be probability distributions over some (countable) set Z, then
‖p− q‖1 = 2 sup
A⊆Z
|p(A)− q(A)| .
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We use the following lemma in our algorithms.
Lemma 2.10 ([NN93]). For every δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a deterministic algorithm which given
O
(
logn+ log 1δ
)
uniformly random bits outputs a δ-biased pseudo-random string of n bits. Any
such δ-biased string is also -statistically close to being k-wise independent for  = δΘ(1) and
k = Θ
(
log 1δ
)
.
2.5 Protocols over qudits
In this section, we revisit two quantum communication protocols, both of which are essential to our
simulation algorithms and analyze the effect of noise on these protocols.
2.5.1 Quantum teleportation over noisy channels
The protocol given here is an extension of quantum teleportation to qudits. Readers may refer to
Chapter 6 in [Wil13] for more details.
Definition 2.11. Quantum teleportation protocol
Alice possesses an arbitrary d-dimensional qudit in state |ψ〉A, which she wishes to communicate
to Bob. They share an MES in the state |φ〉A1B1 .
1. Alice performs a measurement on registers AA1 with respect to the Bell basis
{∣∣∣φj,k〉}
j,k
.
2. She transmits the measurement outcome (j, k) to Bob.
3. Bob applies the unitary transformation ZkB1X
j
B1
on his state to recover |ψ〉.
In the rest of the paper the measurements implemented in Definition 2.11 are referred to as the
teleportation measurements and the receiver’s unitary transformation to recover the target state is
referred to as teleportation decoding operation.
If Bob receives (j′, k′) due to a corruption on Alice’s message, the state he gets after decryption
will be the following:
Zk′BX
j′
BX
d−j
B Z
d−k
B |ψ〉 = ei·
2pi
d
(j′−j)k′Xj′−jZk′−k |ψ〉 . (4)
2.5.2 Quantum Vernam cipher over noisy qudit channels
In this section, we revisit quantum Vernam cipher (QVC) introduced by Leung [Leu02], which is a
quantum analog of Vernam cipher (one-time-pad). For a unitary operation U , the controlled gate
c-U is defined as
(c-U)AB |j〉A |k〉B def= |j〉U j |k〉 .
The extension of quantum Vernam cipher to qudit systems goes as follows.
12
Definition 2.12. Quantum Vernam cipher
Alice possesses an arbitrary d-dimensional qudit in state |ψ〉A, which she wishes to communicate
to Bob. They share an MES pair in the state |φ〉A1B1 |φ〉A2B2 , with Alice and Bob holding registers
A1A2 and B1B2, respectively.
1. Alice applies the unitary transformation (c-Z)A2A (c-X)A1A.
2. She transmits the register A to Bob.
3. Bob applies the unitary transformation
(
c-X−1
)
B1B
(
c-Z−1
)
B2B
.
Quantum Vernam cipher uses entanglement as the key to encrypt quantum information sent through
an insecure quantum channel. In sharp contrast with the classical Vernam cipher, the quantum key
can be recycled securely. Note that if no error occurs on Alice’s message, then Bob recovers the
state |ψ〉 perfectly, and at the end of the protocol the MES pair remain intact. The scheme detects
and corrects for arbitrary transmission errors, and it only requires local operations and classical
communication between the sender and the receiver.
Figure 2: sending one qudit through quantum channel E using quantum Vernam cipher.
In particular, if Alice’s message is corrupted by the Pauli error XjZk, the joint state after Bob’s
decryption is(
c-X−1
)
B1A
(
c-Z−1
)
B2A
XjZk (c-Z)A2A (c-X)A1A |φ〉A1B1 |φ〉A2B2 |ψ〉A
= 1
d
d−1∑
t,t′=0
(
c-X−1
)
B1A
(
c-Z−1
)
B2A
XjZk (c-Z)A2A (c-X)A1A |t〉A1 |t〉B1
∣∣t′〉A2 ∣∣t′〉B2 |ψ〉A
= 1
d
d−1∑
t,t′=0
|t〉A1 |t〉B1
∣∣t′〉A2 ∣∣t′〉B2 X−tZ−t′XjZkZt′Xt |ψ〉A
= 1
d
d−1∑
t,t′=0
ei·
2pi
d
(kt−jt′) |t〉A1 |t〉B1
∣∣t′〉A2 ∣∣t′〉B2 XjZk |ψ〉
=
∣∣∣φ0,k〉
A1B1
∣∣∣φ0,−j〉
A2B2
⊗XjZk |ψ〉 . (5)
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Note that by Equation (5), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Pauli errors and the
state of the maximally entangled pair. An Xj error on the cipher-text is reflected in the state of
the second MES as a Z−j error and a Zk error on the cipher-text is reflected in the state of the first
MES as a Zk error. Note that for every integer s we have(
F ⊗ F †
) ∣∣∣φ0,s〉 = (FZs ⊗ F †) |φ〉 = (FZsF † ⊗ 1) |φ〉 = (Xs ⊗ 1) |φ〉 .
Therefore, in order to extract the error syndrome, it suffices for Alice and Bob to apply F and F †,
respectively, on their marginals of the MESs and measure them in the computational basis. By
comparing their measurement outcomes they can determine the Pauli error.
When quantum Vernam cipher is used for communication of multiple messages, it is possible to
detect errors without disturbing the state of the MES pairs at the cost of an additional fresh MES.
This error detection procedure allows for recycling of MESs which is crucial in order to achieve a
high communication rate, as explained in Section 4.3.2. Here we describe a simplified version of the
detection procedure. First we need the following two lemma.
Proposition 2.13. It holds that
(c-X)A1A2 · (c-X)B1B2
∣∣∣φj1,k1〉
A1B1
∣∣∣φj2,k2〉
A2B2
=
∣∣∣φj1,k1−k2〉
A1B1
∣∣∣φj1+j2,k2〉
A2B2
.
In particular,
(c-X)A1A2 · (c-X)B1B2
∣∣∣φ0,k1〉
A1B1
∣∣∣φ0,k2〉
A2B2
=
∣∣∣φ0,k1−k2〉
A1B1
∣∣∣φ0,k2〉
A2B2
.
Proof.
(c-X)A1A2 · (c-X)B1B2
∣∣∣φj1,k1〉
A1B1
∣∣∣φj2,k2〉
A2B2
= 1
d
d−1∑
t1,t2=0
(c-X)A1A2 · (c-X)B1B2 ei·
2pi
d
(t1k1+t2k2) |t1 + j1〉A1 |t1〉B1 |t2 + j2〉A2 |t2〉B2
= 1
d
d−1∑
t1,t2=0
ei·
2pi
d
(t1k1+t2k2) |t1 + j1〉A1 |t1〉B1 |t2 + j2 + t1 + j1〉A2 |t2 + t1〉B2
=
∣∣∣φj1,k1−k2〉
A1B1
∣∣∣φj1+j2,k2〉
A2B2
.
Suppose that Alice and Bob start with m copies of the MES |φ〉 and use them in pairs to com-
municate messages using QVC over a noisy channel. By Equation (5) all the MESs remain in
span
{∣∣∣φ0,k〉 : 0 ≤ k ≤ d− 1}. This invariance is crucial to the correctness of our simulation. Let∣∣∣φ0,ki〉
AiBi
be the state of the i-th MES after the communication is done. In order to detect errors,
Alice and Bob use an additional MES |φ〉A0B0 . For i = 1, ...,m, Alice and Bob apply (c-X)A0Ai
and (c-X)B0Bi , respectively. By Proposition 2.13, the joint state of the register A0B0 will be∣∣∣φ0,−∑mi=1ki〉
A0B0
. Now, all Alice and Bob need to do is to apply F and F † on registers A0 and
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B0, respectively, and measure their marginal states in the computational basis. By comparing
their measurement outcomes they can decide whether any error has occurred. In this procedure
the MESs used as the keys in QVC are not measured. Note that if the corruptions are chosen so
that ∑mi=1ki = 0 mod d then this procedure fails to detect the errors. We will analyze a modified
version of this error detection procedure in detail in Section 4.3.2 which allows error detection with
high probability independent of the error syndrome.
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3 Teleportation-based protocols via classical channel with large
alphabet
3.1 Overview
We adapt from [BNT+19] the ideas to teleport each quantum message and to rewind the protocol
instead of backtracking.
We also adapt Haeupler’s template [Hae14] to make a conversation robust to noise: Both parties
conduct their original conversation as if there were no noise, except for the following:
• At regular intervals they exchange concise summaries (a Θ (1)-bit hash value) of the conversa-
tion up to the point of the exchange.
• If the summary is consistent, they continue the conversation.
• If the summary is inconsistent, an error is detected. The parties backtrack to an earlier stage
of the conversation and resume from there.
This template can be interpreted as an error correcting code over many messages, with trivial (and
most importantly message-wise) encoding. The 2-way summaries measure the error syndromes
over a large number of messages, thereby preserving the rate. It works (in the classical setting)
by limiting the maximum amount of communication wasted by a single error to O (1). The worst
case error disrupts the consistency checks, but Alice and Bob agree to backtrack a constant amount
when an inconsistency is detected. As the error fraction vanishes, the communication rate goes to 1.
In addition, these consistency tests are efficient, consisting of evaluation of hash functions.
3.1.1 Insufficiency of simply combining [BNT+19] and [Hae14].
Suppose we have to simulate an interactive protocol Π that uses noiseless classical channels in the
teleportation-based model. When implementing Π with noisy classical channels, it is not sufficient to
apply Haeupler’s template to the classical messages used in teleportation, and rewind as in [BNT+19]
when an error is detected. The reason is that, in [BNT+19], each message is expanded to convey
different types of actions in one step (simulating the protocol forward or reversing it). This also
maintains the matching between classical data with the corresponding MES, and the matching
between systems containing MESs. However, this method incurs a large constant factor overhead
which we cannot afford to incur.
3.1.2 New difficulties in rate-optimal simulations.
Due to errors in communication, the parties need to actively rewind the simulation to correct errors
on their joint quantum state. This itself can lead to a situation where the parties may not agree
on how they proceed with the simulation (to rewind simulation or to proceed forward). In order to
move on, both parties first need to know what the other party has done so far in the simulation.
This allows them to obtain a global view of the current joint state and decide on their next action.
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In Ref. [BNT+19], this reconciliation step was facilitated by the extra information sent by each
party and the use of tree codes. This mechanism is not available to us.
3.1.3 Framework.
Our first new idea is to introduce sufficient yet concise data structures so that the parties can detect
inconsistencies in (1) the stage in which they are in the protocol, (2) what type of action they should
be taking, (3) histories leading to the above, (4) histories of measurement outcomes generated by
one party versus the potentially different (corrupted) received instruction for teleportation decoding,
(5) which system contains the next MES to be used, (6) a classical description of the joint quantum
state, which is only partially known to each party. Each of Alice and Bob maintain her/his data
(we collectively call these DA, DB respectively, here), and also an estimate of the other party’s data
(D˜B, D˜A respectively). Without channel noise, these data are equal to their estimates.
3.1.4 A major new obstacle: out-of-sync teleportation.
At every step in the simulation protocol Π′, Alice and Bob may engage in one of three actions: a
forward step in Π, step in reverse, or the exchange of classical summaries. However, the summaries
can also be corrupted. This leads to a new difficulty: errors in the summaries can trigger Alice
and Bob to engage in different actions. In particular, it is possible that one party tries to teleport
while the other expects classical communication, with only one party consuming his/her half of
an MES. They then become out-of-sync over which MESs to use. This kind of problem, to the
best of our knowledge, has not been encountered before, and it is not clear if quantum data can be
protected from such error. (For example, Alice may try to teleport a message into an MES that Bob
already “used” earlier.) One of our main technical contributions is to show that the quantum data
can always be located and recovered when Alice and Bob resolve the inconsistencies in their data
(DA, D˜B) and (D˜A, DB) in the low noise regime. This is particularly surprising since quantum data
can potentially leak irreversibly to the environment (or the adversary): Alice and Bob potentially
operate in an open system due to channel noise, and out-of-sync teleportation a priori does not
protect the messages so sent.
3.1.5 Tight rope between robustness and rate.
The simulation maintains sufficient data structures to store information about each party’s view so
that Alice and Bob can overcome all the obstacles described above. The simulation makes progress
so long as Alice’s and Bob’s views are consistent. The robustness of the simulation requires that the
consistency checks be frequent and sensitive enough so that errors are caught quickly. On the other
hand, to optimize interactive channel capacity, the checks have to remain communication efficient
and not too frequent neither. This calls for delicate analysis in which we balance the two. We also
put in some redundancy in the data structures to simplify the analysis.
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3.2 Result
In this section, we focus on the teleportation-based quantum communication model with polynomial-
size alphabet. In more detail, Alice and Bob share an unlimited number of copies of an MES before
the protocol begins. The parties effectively send each other a qudit using an MES and communicating
two classical symbols from the communication alphabet. The complexity of the protocol is the
number of classical symbols exchanged, while the MESs used are available for free. We call this
model noiseless if the classical channel is noiseless.
The following is our main result in this model for simulation of an n-round noiseless communication
protocol over an adversarial channel that corrupts any  fraction of the transmitted symbols.
Theorem 3.1. Consider any n-round alternating communication protocol Π in the teleportation-
based model, communicating messages over a noiseless channel with an alphabet Σ of bit-size
Θ (logn). Algorithm 3 is a computationally efficient coding scheme which given Π, simulates it
with probability at least 1− 2−Θ(n), over any fully adversarial error channel with alphabet Σ and
error rate . The simulation uses n (1 + Θ (
√
)) rounds of communication, and therefore achieves
a communication rate of 1 − Θ (√). Furthermore. the computational complexity of the coding
operations is O
(
n2
)
.
3.3 Description of Protocol
We follow the notation associated with quantum communication protocols introduced in Section 2.1
in the description below.
Recall that in the teleportation-based quantum communication model, Alice and Bob implement a
protocol Π0 with prior shared entanglement and quantum communication by substituting telepor-
tation for quantum communication. For simplicity, we assume that Π0 is alternating, and begins
with Alice. In the implementation Π of Π0, the message register C from Π0 has two counterparts,
CA and CB, held by Alice and Bob, respectively. The unitary operations on AC in Π0 are applied
by Alice on ACA in Π. When Alice sends the qudit in C to Bob in Π0, she applies the teleportation
measurement to CA and her share of the next available MES, and sends the measurement outcome
to Bob in Π. Then Bob applies a decoding operation on his share of the MES, based on the message
received, and swaps the MES register with CB. Bob and Alice’s actions in Π when Bob wishes to do
a local operation and send a qudit to Alice in Π0 are analogously defined. For ease of comparison
with the joint state in Π0, we describe the joint state of the registers in Π (or its simulation over
a noisy channel) in terms of registers ABC. There, C stands for CA if Alice is to send the next
message or all messages have been sent, and for CB if Bob is to send the next message.
Starting with such a protocol Π in the teleportation-based model, we design a simulation protocol Π′
which uses a noisy classical channel. The simulation works with blocks of even number of messages.
By a block of size r (for even r) of Π, we mean a sequence of r local operations and messages
alternately sent in Π by Alice and Bob, starting with Alice.
Roughly speaking, Alice and Bob run the steps of the original protocol Π as is, in blocks of size
r
def= Θ( 1√

), with r even. They exchange summary information between these blocks, in order to
check whether they agree on the operations that have been applying to the quantum registers ABC
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in the simulation. The MESs used for teleportations are correspondingly divided into blocks of r
MESs, implicitly numbered from 1 to r: the odd numbered ones are used to simulate quantum
communication from Alice to Bob, and the even numbered ones from Bob to Alice. If either party
detects an error in transmission, they may run a block of Π in reverse, or simply communicate
classically to help recover from the error. The classical communication is also conducted in sequences
equal in length to the ones involving a block of Π. A block of Π′ refers to any of these types of
sequences.
3.3.1 Metadata
In more detail, Alice uses an iteration in Π′ for one out of four different types of operations: evolving
the simulation by running a block of Π in the forward direction (denoted a “+1” block); reversing
the simulation by applying inverses of unitary operations of Π (denoted a “−1” block); synchronizing
with Bob on the number of MESs used so far by applying identity operators between rounds of
teleportation or reversing such an iteration (denoted a “0” block, with 0 standing for the application
of unitary operations U0i which are 1AC); catching up on the description of the protocol so far by
exchanging classical data with Bob (denoted a “C” block, with C standing for “classical”). Alice
records the sequence of types of iterations as her “metadata” in the string FullMA ∈ {±1, 0,C}∗.
FullMA gets extended by one symbol for each new iteration of the simulation protocol Π′. The
number of blocks of r MESs Alice has used is denoted qMA which corresponds to the number of
non-C symbols in FullMA. Similarly, Bob maintains data FullMB and qMB.
FullMA and FullMB may not agree due to the transmission errors. To counter this, the two players
exchange information about their metadata at the end of each block. Hence, Alice also holds M˜B
and qM˜B as her best estimation of Bob’s metadata and the number of MESs he has used, respectively.
Similarly, Bob holds M˜A and qM˜A. We use these data to control the simulation; before taking any
action in Π′, Alice checks if her guess M˜B equals FullMB. Bob does the analogous check for his
data.
3.3.2 Number of MESs used
Once both parties reconcile their view of each other’s metadata with the actual data, they might
detect a discrepancy in the number of MESs they have used. The three drawings in Figure 3 represent
the d n2r (1 + O(r))e blocks of r = O(
√
1/) MESs at different points in the protocol: first, before
the protocol begins; second, when Alice and Bob have used the same number of MESs; and third,
when they are not synchronized, say, Alice has used more blocks of MESs than Bob. A difference
in qMA and qMB indicates that the joint state of the protocol Π can no longer be recovered from
registers ACACBB alone. Since one party did not correctly complete the teleportation operations,
the (possibly erroneous) joint state may be thought of as having “leaked” into the partially measured
MESs which were used by only one party. We will elaborate on this scenario in Section 3.3.4.
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Figure 3: These figures represent the MES blocks at different stages of the protocol. The systems
depicted by circles have not been used yet for teleportation, those depicted by squares have been
used already. (either “Measured” or teleportation-decoded.) Figure (a) represents the MES blocks
at the beginning of the protocol, when none have been used. Figure (b) represents them when Alice
and Bob have used the same number of them; this is the desired situation. Figure (c) represents
a situation when Alice and Bob are out of sync; e.g., Alice has used more MES blocks than Bob.
They then work to get back in sync before resuming the simulation.
3.3.3 Pauli data
The last piece of information required to complete the description of what has happened so far on
the quantum registers ABC is about the Pauli operators corresponding to teleportation, which we
call the “Pauli data”. These Pauli data contain information about the teleportation measurement
outcomes as well as about the teleportation decoding operations. Since incorrect teleportation
decoding may arise due to the transmission errors, we must allow the parties to apply Pauli
corrections at some point. We choose to concentrate such Pauli corrections on the receiver’s side
at the end of each teleportation. These Pauli corrections are computed from the history of all
classical data available, before the evolution or reversal of Π in a block starts. The measurement
data are directly transmitted over the noisy classical communication channel and the decoding data
are directly taken to be the data received over the noisy channel. If there is no transmission error,
the decoding Pauli operation should correspond to the inverse of the effective measurement Pauli
operation and cancel out to yield a noiseless quantum channel. Figure 4 depicts the different types
of Pauli data in a block corresponding to type +1 for Alice and −1 for Bob. The Pauli operations
applied on Alice’s side are in the following order:
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teleportation measurement for the first qudit she sends,
decoding operation for the first qudit she receives,
correction operation for the same qudit (the first qudit she receives);
teleportation measurement for the second qudit she sends,
decoding operation for the second qudit she receives,
correction operation for the same qudit (the second qudit she receives);
and so on.
The Pauli operations applied on Bob’s side are in a different order:
decoding operation for the first qudit he receives,
correction operation for the same qudit (the first qudit he receives),
teleportation measurement for the first qudit he teleports;
decoding operation for the second qudit he receives,
correction operation for the same qudit (the second qudit he receives),
teleportation measurement for the second qudit he sends;
and so on.
Alice records as her Pauli data in the string FullPA ∈ (Σ3r)∗, the sequence of Pauli operators that
are applied on the quantum register on her side. Each block of FullPA is divided into 3 parts of r
symbols from the alphabet set Σ. The first part corresponds to the r2 teleportation measurement
outcomes with two symbols for each measurement outcome. Each of the r2 teleportation decoding
operations are represented by two symbols in the second part. Finally, the third part contains two
symbols for each of the r2 Pauli corrections. Similarly, Bob records the sequence of Pauli operators
applied on his side in FullPB. As described above, the measurement outcome and the decoding
Pauli operations are available to the sender and the receiver, respectively. Based on the message
transcript in Π′ so far, Alice maintains her best guess P˜B for Bob’s Pauli data and Bob maintains
his best guess P˜A for Alice’s Pauli data. These data also play an important role in the simulation.
Before taking any action in Π′, Alice checks if her guess P˜B equals FullPB. Bob does the analogous
check for his data.
Alice and Bob check and synchronize their classical data, i.e., the metadata and Pauli data, by
employing the ideas underlying the Haeupler algorithm [Hae14]. Once they agree on each other’s
metadata and Pauli data, they both possess enough information to compute the content of the
quantum register (to the best of their knowledge).
3.3.4 Out-of-Sync Teleportation
Basic out-of-sync scenario
Consider an iteration in which Alice believes she should implement a +1 block, while Bob believes
he has to resolve an inconsistency in their classical data. Alice will simulate one block of the input
protocol Π, consuming the next block of MESs. On the other hand, Bob will try to resolve the
inconsistency through classical communication alone, and not access the quantum registers. Thus
Alice will treat Bob’s messages as the outcomes of his teleportation measurements, and she performs
the teleportation decoding operations according to these messages. The situation is even worse,
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Figure 4: Representation of the teleportation scheme for a size r block. The figure on the left
corresponds to Alice and Bob having blocks of type +1, the most common block type, and the one
on the right to a block of type −1 for both. The large rectangles correspond to unitary operations
of the original protocol or their inverses, or even an identity operator, being applied by Alice or
by Bob to AC or BC, respectively. Bob has r/2 rectangles and applies a unitary operation or an
inverse in each of them whenever he has a block of type ±1. Alice has r/2 + 1 rectangles and uses
the first r/2 to apply unitary operations in a block of type +1 and apply an identity on the last
one, while she applies an identity in the first one and inverses of unitary operations in the r/2 last
ones in a block of type −1. This is so that a −1 block for Alice can be the inverse of a +1 block
for Alice, and vice-versa. The small circles correspond to the Pauli operations due to teleportation
measurement and teleportation decoding, with the teleportation being from Alice to Bob on odd
numbered MESs and from Bob to Alice on even numbered MESs. The small squares on the receiver
side right after the teleportation decoding circle corresponds to the Pauli corrections made in order
to try to correct errors in previous blocks.
since Alice sends quantum information to Bob through teleportation of which Bob is unaware, and
Bob views the teleportation measurement outcomes sent by Alice as classical information about
Alice’s local Pauli data and metadata corresponding to previous iterations. Note that at this point
the quantum state in registers ABC may potentially be lost. This scenario could continue for
several iterations and derail the simulation completely. To recover from such a situation, especially
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to retrieve the quantum information in the unused MESs at his end, it would seem that Alice
and Bob would have to rewind the simulation steps in Π′ (and not only the steps of the original
protocol Π′) to an appropriate point in the past. This rewinding itself would be subject to error,
and the situation seems hopeless. Nonetheless, we provide a simple solution to address this kind of
error, which translates out-of-sync teleportation to errors in implementing the forward simulation
or rewinding of the original protocol Π.
As explained in the previous subsection, Alice and Bob first reconcile their view of the history of
the simulation stored in their metadata. Through this, suppose they both discover the discrepancy
in the number of MESs used. (There are other scenarios as well; for example, they may both think
that qMA = qMB. These scenarios lead to further errors, but the simulation protocol Π′ eventually
discovers the difference in MESs used.) In the scenario in which Alice and Bob both discover
that qMA 6= qMB, they try to “gather” the quantum data hidden in the partially used MESs back
into the registers ABC. In more detail, suppose Bob has used fewer MESs than Alice, and he
discovers this at the beginning of the i-th iteration. Let E1E2 · · ·Er be registers with Bob that hold
the halves of the first block of MESs that Alice has used but Bob has not. Note that E1, E3, . . . , Er−1
contain quantum information teleported by Alice, and E2, E4, . . . , Er are MES-halves intended for
teleportation by Bob. The MES-halves corresponding to E2, E4, . . . , Er have already been used by
Alice to “complete” the teleportations she assumed Bob has performed. Say Alice used this block of
MESs in the i′-th iteration. In the i-th iteration, Bob teleports the qudit E1 using the MES-half E2,
E3 with E4, and so on. That is, Bob teleports qudit Ej using the MES-half Ej+1 in increasing
order of j, for all odd j ∈ [r], as if the even numbered MESs had not been used by Alice. The effect
of this teleportation is the same as if Alice and Bob had both tried to simulate the local operations
and communication from the original protocol in the i′-th iteration (in the forward direction or to
correct the joint state), except that the following also happened independently of channel error :
1. the Pauli operations used by Bob to decode E1, E3, . . . , Er−1 were all the identity,
2. the unitary operations used by Bob on the registers BC were all the identity, and
3. the Pauli operations applied by Alice for decoding Bob’s teleportation were unrelated to the
outcome of Bob’s teleportation measurements.
This does not guarantee correctness of the joint state in ABC, but has the advantage that quantum
information in the MES-halves E1, E3, . . . , Er−1 that is required to restore correctness is redirected
back into the registers ABC. In particular, the difference in the number of MESs used by the two
parties is reduced, while the errors in the joint quantum state in ABC potentially increase. The
errors in the joint state are eventually corrected by reversing the incorrect unitary operations, as in
the case when the teleportations are all synchronized.
To understand the phenomenon described above, consider a simpler scenario where Bob wishes to
teleport a qudit |ξ〉 in register B1 to Alice using an MES in registers E′1E1, after which Alice applies
the unitary operation V to register E′1. If they follow the corresponding sequence of operations,
the final state would be V |ξ〉, stored in register E′1. Instead suppose they do the following. First,
Alice applies V to register E′1, then Bob measures registers B1E1 in the generalized Bell basis and
gets measurement outcome (j, k). He sends this outcome to Alice. We may verify the state of
register E′1 conditioned on the outcome is V (XjZk) |ξ〉. Thus, the quantum information in ξ is
redirected to the correct register, albeit with a Pauli error (that is known to Alice because of his
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message). In particular, Alice may later reverse V to correctly decode the teleported state. The
chain of teleportation steps described in the previous paragraph has a similar effect.
3.3.5 First representation of the quantum registers
A first representation for the content of the quantum registers ABC in Π′ can be obtained directly
and explicitly from the metadata and the Pauli data, and is denoted JS1, as in Eq. (6) below, with
JS standing for “joint state”. We emphasize that this is the state conditioned on the outcomes of
the teleportation measurements as well as the transcript of classical messages received by the two
parties. However, the form JS1 is essentially useless for deciding the next action that the simulation
protocol Π′ should take, but it can be simplified into a more useful representation. This latter form,
denoted JS2, as in Eq. (7) below, directly corresponds to the further actions we may take in order
to evolve the simulation of the original protocol or to actively reverse previous errors. We first
consider JS1 and JS2 in the case when qMA = qMB.
We sketch how to obtain JS1 from FullMA, FullMB, FullPA and FullPB (when qMA = qMB).
Each block of r MESs which have been used by both Alice and Bob corresponds to a bracketed
expression [∗j] for some content “∗j” corresponding to the j-th block that we describe below. The
content of the quantum registers is then the ABC part of
JS1 = [∗qMA] · · · [∗2][∗1] |ψinit〉ABCER , (6)
with |ψinit〉ABCER being the initial state of the original protocol. (To be accurate, the representation
corresponds to the sequence of operations that have been applied to |ψinit〉, and knowledge of |ψinit〉
is not required to compute the representation.) It remains to describe the content ∗j of the j-th
bracket. It contains from right to left r2 iterations of the following:
Alice’s unitary operation - Alice’s teleportation measurement outcome -
Bob’s teleportation decoding - Bob’s Pauli correction - Bob’s unitary operation - Bob’s
teleportation measurement outcome -
Alice’s teleportation decoding - Alice’s Pauli correction.
It also allows for an additional unitary operation of Alice on the far left when she is implementing a
block of type −1; we elaborate on this later. If Alice’s block type is +1, all her unitary operations are
consecutive unitary operations from the original protocol (with the index of the unitary operations
depending on the number of ±1 in FullMA), while if it is −1, they are inverses of such unitary
operations. If Alice’s block type is 0, all unitary operations are equal to the identity on registers
ACA. Similar properties hold for Bob’s unitary operations on registers BC. Alice’s block type
corresponds to the content of the j-th non-C element in FullMA, and Bob’s to the content of the
j-th non-C element in FullMB. Alice’s Pauli data corresponds to the content of the j-th block in
FullPA, and Bob’s to the content of the j-th block in FullPB. The precise rules by which Alice and
Bob determine their respective types for a block in Π′, and which blocks of Π (if any) are involved,
are deferred to the next section. Note that when qMA = qMB, the first qMA MES blocks have been
used by both parties but not necessarily in the same iterations. Nevertheless, the remedial actions
the parties have taken to recover from out-of-sync teleportation have reduced the error on the joint
state to transmission errors as if all the teleportations were synchronized and the adversary had
introduced those additional errors; see Section3.3.4.
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To give a concrete example, suppose from her classical data, Alice determines that in her j-th
non-C block of Π′, she should actively reverse the unitary operations of block k of Π to correct some
error in the joint state. So her j-th non-C block of Π′ is of type −1. Suppose Alice’s Pauli data
in the j-th block of FullPA correspond to Pauli operators pA,1pA,2 · · · pA,3r/2 in the order affecting
the joint state. I.e., the Pauli operators pA,1 , pA,4 , . . . , pA,3(r/2−1)+1 correspond to the sequence
of Alice’s teleportation measurement outcomes, the Pauli operators pA,2 , pA,5 , . . . , pA,3(r/2−1)+2
are her teleportation decoding operations and pA,3 , pA,6 , . . . , pA,3r/2 are her Pauli corrections,
respectively. Consider Bob’s j-th non-C block of Π′. Note that this may be a different block
of Π′ than Alice’s j-th non-C block. Suppose from his classical data, Bob determines that in
his j-th non-C block of Π′, he should apply the unitary operations of block l of Π to evolve the
joint state further. So his j-th non-C block of Π′ is of type +1. Suppose Bob’s Pauli data in
the j-th block of FullPB correspond to Pauli operators pB,1pB,2 · · · pB,3r/2, in the order affecting
the joint state. I.e., the Pauli operators pB,1 , pB,4 , . . . , pB,3(r/2−1)+1 are Bob’s decoding operations
and pB,2 , pB,5 , . . . , pB,3(r/2−1)+2 are his Pauli corrections and pB,3 , pB,6 , . . . , pB,3r/2 correspond to
his teleportation measurement outcomes, respectively. Then from FullMA,FullMB,FullPA,FullPB,
we can compute a description of the joint state as in Eq. (6), with ∗j equal to
U−1kr+1
×
(
pA,3(r/2−1)+3 pA,3(r/2−1)+2
) (
pB,3(r/2−1)+3 Ulr+r pB,3(r/2−1)+2 pB,3(r/2−1)+1
)
×
(
pA,3(r/2−1)+1 U−1kr+3
)
× · · ·
×
(
pA,3(s−1)+3 pA,3(s−1)+2
) (
pB,3(s−1)+3 Ulr+2s pB,3(s−1)+2 pB,3(s−1)+1
)
×
(
pA,3(s−1)+1 U−1kr+(r−2s+3)
)
× · · ·
× (pA,6 pA,5) (pB,6 Ulr+4 pB,5 pB,4)
(
pA,4 U
−1
kr+(r−1)
)
× (pA,3 pA,2) (pB,3 Ulr+2 pB,2 pB,1) (pA,1 1) .
Note that Alice and Bob are not necessarily able to compute the state JS1. Instead, they use their
best guess for the other party’s metadata and Pauli data in the procedure described in this section
to compute their estimates JS1A and JS1B of JS1, respectively. Note that Alice and Bob will not
compute their estimates of JS1 unless they believe that they both know each other’s metadata and
Pauli data and have used the same number of MES blocks.
3.3.6 Second representation of the quantum registers
To obtain JS2 from JS1, we first look inside each bracket and recursively cancel consecutive Pauli
operators inside the bracket. In case a bracket evaluates to the identity operator on registers ABC,
we remove it. Once each bracket has been cleaned up in this way, we recursively try to cancel
consecutive brackets if their contents correspond to the inverse of one another (assuming that no
two Ui of the original protocol are the same or inverses of one another). Once no such cancellation
works out anymore, what we are left with is representation JS2, which is of the following form
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(when qMA = qMB):
JS2 = [#b] · · · [#1][Ugr · · ·U(g−1)r+2U(g−1)r+1] · · · [Ur · · ·U2U1] |ψinit〉ABCER . (7)
Here, the first g brackets starting from the right correspond to the “good” part of the simulation,
while the last b brackets correspond to the “bad” part of the simulation, the part that Alice and
Bob have to actively rewind later. The integer g is determined by the left-most bracket such
that along with its contents, those of the brackets to the right equal the sequence of unitary
operations U1, U2, . . . , Ugr from the original protocol Π in reverse. The brackets to the left of the
last g brackets are all considered bad blocks. Thus, the content of [#1] is not [U(g+1)r · · ·Ugr+1],
while the contents of [#2] to [#b] are arbitrary and have to be actively rewound before Alice and
Bob can reverse the content of [#1].
Once the two parties synchronize their metadata, the number of MESs they have used and their
Pauli data, they compute their estimates of JS1. Alice uses JS1A in the above procedure to compute
her estimate JS2A of JS2. Similarly, Bob computes JS2B from JS1B. These in turn determine their
course of action in the simulation as described next. If b > 0, they actively reverse the incorrect
unitary operators in the last bad block, while assuming the other party does the same. They start
by applying the inverse of [#b], choosing appropriately whether to have a type ±1 or 0 block, and
also choosing appropriate Pauli corrections. Else, if b = 0, they continue implementing unitary
operations Ugr+1 to U(g+1)r of the original input protocol Π to evolve the simulation. Note that
each player has their independent view of the joint state, and takes actions assuming that their view
is correct. In this process, Alice and Bob use their view of the joint state to predict each other’s
next action in the simulation and extend their estimates of each other’s metadata and Pauli data
accordingly.
We describe a few additional subtleties on how the parties access the quantum register in a given
block, as represented in Figure 4. First, each block begins and ends with Alice holding register C
and being able to perform a unitary operation. In +1 blocks, she applies a unitary operation at the
beginning and not at the end, whereas in −1 blocks she applies the inverse of a unitary operation
at the end and not at the beginning. This is in order to allow a −1 block to be the inverse of a
+1 block, and vice-versa. Second, whenever Alice and Bob are not synchronized in the number of
MESs they have used so far, as explained in Section 3.3.4, the party who has used more will wait
for the other to catch up by creating a new type C block while the party who has used less will
try to catch up by creating a type 0 block, sequentially feeding the C register at the output of
a teleportation decoding to the input of the next teleportation measurement. Notice that due to
errors in communication, it might happen that +1 blocks are used to correct previous erroneous
−1 blocks and 0 blocks are used to correct previous erroneous 0 blocks. As illustrated in Figure 4,
the block on the right is the inverse of the one on the left if the corresponding Pauli operators are
inverses of each other.
3.3.7 Representations of quantum registers while out-of-sync
We now define the JS1 and JS2 representations of the joint state in the case when qMA 6= qMB. Note
that in this case, conditioned on the classical data with the two parties, JS1 and JS2 represent a
pure state. However, in addition to the ABCER registers, we must also include the half-used MES
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registers in the representation. Let u def= |qMA − qMB|. For concreteness, suppose that qMA > qMB.
Then the JS1 representation is of the following form:
JS1 = [∗qMA] · · · [∗qMB] · · · [∗2][∗1] |ψinit〉ABCER . (8)
The content of the first qMB brackets from the right, corresponding to the MES blocks which
have been used by both parties are obtained as described in Subsection 3.3.5. The leftmost u
brackets correspond to the MES blocks which have been used only by Alice. We refer to these
blocks as the ugly blocks. These brackets contain Alice’s unitary operations from the input protocol,
her teleportation decoding operations and Pauli correction operations in her last u non-classical
iterations of the simulation. Additionally, they contain the u blocks of MES registers used only
by Alice. In each of these blocks, the registers indexed by an odd number have been measured on
Alice’s side and the state of the MES register has collapsed to a state which is obtained from Alice’s
Pauli data.
The representation JS2 is obtained from JS1 as follows: We denote by [@u] · · · [@1] the leftmost u
brackets corresponding to the ugly blocks. We use the procedure described in Subsection 3.3.6 on
the rightmost qMB brackets in JS1 to obtain JS2 of the following form:
JS2 = [@u] · · · [@1][#b] · · · [#1][Ugr · · ·U(g−1)r+2U(g−1)r+1] · · · [Ur · · ·U2U1] |ψinit〉ABCER , (9)
with g good blocks, and b bad blocks, for some non-negative integers g, b.
Thus, in the rest of this section, we assume that JS2 is of the form of Equation (9) at the end of
each iteration for some non-negative integers g, b, u which are given by
g
def= the number of good unitary blocks in JS2, (10)
b
def= the number of bad unitary blocks in JS2, and (11)
u
def= |qMA − qMB|. (12)
We point out that Alice and Bob compute their estimates of JS1 and JS2 only if, based on their
view of the simulation so far, they believe that they have used the same number of MES blocks.
Therefore, whenever computed, JS1A, JS1B and JS2A, JS2B are always of the forms described in
Subsections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6, respectively.
Notice that if there are no transmission errors or hash collisions and Alice and Bob do as described
earlier in this section after realizing that qMA > qMB, then the ugly blocks [@u] · · · [@2] remain
as they were while block [@1] becomes a standard block of unitary operations acting on registers
ABC only, quite probably being a new bad block, call it [#b+ 1]. More generally, if there is either
a transmission error or a hash collision, Bob might not realize that qMA > qMB. Then he might
either have a C type of iteration in which case block [@1] also remain as is, or else it is a +1, −1
or 0 (non-C) type of iteration and then he may apply non-identity Pauli operations and unitary
operations on registers BC, which still results in block [@1] becoming a standard block of unitary
operations acting on registers ABC only. Similarly if there is either a transmission error or a hash
collision, Alice might not realize that qMA > qMB. Then she might have a non-C type of iteration
in which case a new ugly block, call it [@u+ 1], would be added to the left of [@u].
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3.3.8 Summary of main steps
The different steps that Alice and Bob follow in the simulation protocol Π′ are summarized in
Algorithm 2. Recall that each party runs the simulation algorithm based on their view of the
simulation so far.
Algorithm 2:Main steps in one iteration of the simulation for the large alphabet teleportation-
based model
1 Agree on the history of the simulation contained in the metadata, i.e., ensure FullMA = M˜A
and FullMB = M˜B. This involves Algorithm 5—rewindMD, and Algorithm 6—extendMD.
2 Synchronize the number of MESs used, in particular, ensure qMA = qM˜B and qMB = qM˜A.
This involves Algorithm 7—syncMES.
3 Agree on Pauli data for all the teleportation steps and additional Pauli corrections for
addressing channel errors, i.e., ensure FullPA = P˜A and FullPB = P˜B. This is done via
Algorithm 8—rewindPD and Algorithm 9—extendPD.
4 Compute the best guess for JS1 and JS2. If there are any “bad” blocks in the guess for JS2,
reverse the last bad block of unitary operations. I.e., implement quantum rewinding so
that b = 0 in JS2. This is done in Algorithm 11—simulate.
5 If no “bad” blocks remain, implement the next block of the original protocol. This results in
an increase in g in JS2, and is also done through Algorithm 11—simulate.
The algorithms mentioned in each step are presented in the next section. Figure 5 summarizes the
main steps in flowchart form.
In every iteration exactly one of the steps listed in Algorithm 2 is conducted. Alice and Bob skip
one step to the next only if the goal of the step has been achieved through the previous iterations.
The simulation protocol is designed so that unless there is a transmission error or a hash collision
in comparing a given type of data, Alice and Bob will go down these steps in tandem, while never
returning to a previous step. For instance, once Alice and Bob achieve the goal of step 1, as long
as no transmission error or hash collision occurs, their metadata will remain synchronized while
they are conducting any of the next steps. This is in fact a crucial property which we utilize in the
analysis of the algorithm. In particular, to ensure this property, Alice and Bob need to synchronize
the number of MESs they have used before synchronizing their Pauli data.
3.4 Algorithm
In this section, we present our simulation protocol Π′ in the teleportation-based model when
the communication alphabet is polynomial-size. We first introduce the data structure used in
our algorithm in this model, which summarizes the definition of the variables appearing in the
pseudocodes.
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Figure 5: Flowchart of the teleportation-based scheme for high rate noisy interactive quantum
communication. Most of the communication is spent actually trying to simulate the protocol, in
the simulate subroutine.
3.4.1 Data structure
• Metadata: In every iteration NewMetaA ∈ {±1, 0,C} corresponds to Alice’s block type
which determines how the simulation of the input protocol proceeds locally on Alice’s side.
NewMetaA = C corresponds to a classical iteration, in which Alice does not access the quantum
registers. NewMetaA ∈ {±1, 0} determines the exponent of the unitary operators from the
input protocol Π applied by Alice in the current iteration of the simulation. Alice records her
metadata in FullMA which is concatenated with NewMetaA in every iteration and has length
i after i iterations. Her best guess of Bob’s block type in the current iteration is denoted
by ˜NewMetaB. Alice maintains a guess for Bob’s metadata in M˜B which gets modified or
corrected as she gains more information through interaction with Bob. Note that M˜B is not
necessarily full-length in every iteration and its length may decrease. `M˜B denotes the length
of M˜B. Bob’s local data, NewMetaB, FullMB, ˜NewMetaA, M˜A and `M˜A are defined similarly.
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Alice maintains a guess `MA for the length of M˜A, which is with Bob. We define MA to be the
prefix of FullMA of length `MA, i.e., MA
def= FullMA [1 : `MA]. When MA appears in any of
the algorithms in this section, it is implicitly computed by Alice from FullMA and `MA. The
number of MES blocks used by Alice for teleportation is denoted by qMA. We use qM˜B to
denote Alice’s guess of the number of MES blocks used by Bob. Note that qMA and qM˜B are
the number of 0, 1 and −1 symbols in MA and M˜B, respectively. Bob’s MB, `MB, qMB and
qM˜A are defined similarly.
• Pauli data: In every iteration NewPauliA ∈ (Σr)3 consists of three parts: The first part
corresponds to the outcomes of Alice’s teleportation measurements in the current iteration;
the second part corresponds to the received transmissions which determine the teleportation
decoding operation and the last part which corresponds to Pauli corrections.
The Pauli data are recorded locally by Alice in FullPA. Starting from the empty string, FullPA
is concatenated with NewPauliA whenever Alice implements a non-C iteration. Alice’s best
guess for Bob’s NewMetaB in each iteration is denoted by ˜NewMetaB. She maintains a string
P˜B as an estimate of Bob’s Pauli data. The length of P˜B is denoted by `P˜B. Alice also
maintains `PA, her estimate for the length of P˜A, which is with Bob. PA denotes the prefix of
FullPA of length `PA, i.e., PA
def= FullPA [1 : `PA]. When PA appears in any of the algorithms
in this section, it is implicitly computed by Alice from FullPA and `PA. Bob’s local Pauli data
NewPauliB , FullPB , ˜NewPauliA , P˜A , `P˜A , `PB , PB are defined similarly.
A critical difference between the metadata and the Pauli data is that the metadata assigns
one symbol for each block while the Pauli data assigns 3r symbols for each block.
• We use H with the corresponding data as subscript to denote the hashed data, e.g., HMA
denotes the hash value of the string MA.
• The data with ′ denote the received data after transmission over the noisy channel, e.g., `′MB
denotes what Alice receives when Bob sends `MB.
• The variable Itertype ∈ {MD,PD,MES,SIM} determines the iteration type for the party: MD
and PD correspond to iterations where metadata and Pauli data are processed or modified,
MES is used for iterations where the party is trying to catch up on the number of used MESs,
and SIM corresponds to iterations where the party proceeds with evolving the simulation of
Π by applying a block of unitary operators from Π or the inverse of such a block of unitary
operators in order to fix an earlier error.
• The variable RewindExtend ∈ {R,E} determines in classical iterations if a string of the local
metadata or Pauli data is extended or rewound in the current iteration.
3.4.2 Pseudo-codes
This section contains the pseudo-codes for the main algorithm and the subroutines that each party
runs locally in the simulation protocol. The subroutines are the following: Preprocess, which
determines what will happen locally to the classical and quantum data in the current iteration of
the simulation; rewindMD and extendMD, which process the local metadata; syncMES which handles
the case when the two parties do not agree on the number of MES blocks they have used; rewindPD
and extendPD, process the local Pauli data; and finally, simulate, in which the player moves on with
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the simulation of the input protocol according to the information from subroutine Computejointstate
of Preprocess. When the party believes that the classical data are fully synchronized, he or she
uses the subroutine Computejointstate to extract the necessary information to decide how to evolve
the joint quantum state next. This information includes JS1 and JS2 defined in (6) and (7),
respectively, NewMetaA, RewindExtend, ˜NewMetaB, Block which represents the index of the block
of unitary operations from the input protocol Π the party will perform, PCorr representing Alice’s
Pauli corrections and P˜Corr representing Alice’s guess of Bob’s Pauli corrections.
For the subroutines used in the simulation protocol, we list all the global variables accessed by the
subroutine as the Input at the beginning of the subroutine. Whenever applicable, the relation
between the variables when the subroutine is called is stated as the Promise and the global variables
which are modified by the subroutine are listed as the Output.
Remark 3.2. The amount of communication in each iteration of Algorithm 3 is independent of
the iteration type.
Remark 3.3. Since in every iteration of Algorithm 3 the lengths of FullMA and FullMB increase
by 1, in order to be able to catch up on the metadata, Alice and Bob need to communicate two
symbols at a time when extending the metadata. This is done by encoding the two symbols into
strings of length r of the channel alphabet Σ using the mapping encodeMD in Algorithm 4 and
decoding it using the mapping decodeMD in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 3: Main algorithm (Alice’s side)
Input: n round protocol Π in teleportation-based model over polynomial-size alphabet Σ
1 Initialize
r ← Θ (1/√) ;
Rtotal ← d n2r + Θ(n)e ;
qMA, `MA, `M˜B, `PA, `P˜B ← 0 ;
MA, M˜B,PA, P˜B ← ∅ ;
2 h← hash function of Lemma 2.5 with p = 1/n5 and o = s = Θ(logn) ;
3 Measure Θ (Rtotal) MESs in the computational basis and record the binary representation of
the outcomes in S1, . . . , S4Rtotal ;
// 4Rtotal seeds of length s for the hash function h
4 For i = 1→ Rtotal
B Preprocessing phase
5 HMA ← hS4i−3 (MA) ;
6 HM˜B ← hS4i−2
(
M˜B
)
;
7 HPA ← hS4i−1 (PA) ;
8 HP˜B ← hS4i
(
P˜B
)
;
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Algorithm 3: Main algorithm (Alice’s side, cont. from previous page)
9
10 Send (
HMA, `MA, HM˜B, `M˜B, HPA, `PA, HP˜B, `P˜B
)
;
11 Receive (
H ′
M˜A
, `′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
MB, H
′
P˜A
, `′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
PB
)
;
12 Preprocess;
13 if Itertype 6= SIM then
14 Send msg;
15 Receive msg′;
// messages are communicated alternately
B Case i.A
16 if Itertype = MD and RewindExtend = R then
17 rewindMD;
B Case i.B
18 else if Itertype = MD and RewindExtend = E then
19 extendMD;
B Case ii.A
20 else if Itertype = MES and NewMetaA = C then
21 return;
B Case ii.B
22 else if Itertype = MES and NewMetaA = 0 then
23 syncMES;
B Case iii.A
24 else if Itertype = PD and RewindExtend = R then
25 rewindPD;
B Case iii.B
26 else if Itertype = PD and RewindExtend = E then
27 extendPD;
// Classical data are synchronized
B Case iv
28 else
29 simulate.
30 return Main algorithm;
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Algorithm 4: Preprocess (Alice’s side)
Input:  HMA, `MA, HM˜B, `M˜B, HPA, `PA, HP˜B, `P˜BH ′M˜A, `′M˜A, H ′MB, `′MB, H ′P˜A, `′P˜A, H ′PB, `′PB
FullMA, M˜B,FullPA, P˜B, qMA

Output:
(
Itertype,RewindExtend,NewMetaA,FullMA, `MA, ˜NewMetaB, `M˜B,msg
)
1 if
(
HMA, HM˜B
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB
)
and `MA = `′M˜A = `M˜B = `
′
MB = i− 1 then
2 Compute qM˜B;
B Processing metadata
B Case i.A
3 if
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B
)
6=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
, `′MB
)
then
4 Itertype ← MD;
5 RewindExtend ← R;
6 NewMetaA← C;
7 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
8 msg ← dummy message of length r;
B Case i.B
9 else if (`MA < i− 1) or
(
`M˜B < i− 1
)
then
10 Itertype ← MD;
11 RewindExtend ← E;
12 NewMetaA← C;
13 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
14 if `MA < i− 1 then
15 msg ← encodeMD (FullMA [`MA + 1, `MA + 2]); // Encode MD in Σr
16 else
17 msg ← dummy message of length r;
B Comparing number of used MES blocks
B Case ii.A
18 else if qMA > qM˜B then
19 Itertype ← MES;
20 NewMetaA← C;
21 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
22 `MA ← `MA + 1;
23 ˜NewMetaB ← 0;
24 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
25 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
26 msg ← dummy message of length r;
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Algorithm 4: Preprocess (Alice’s side, cont. from previous page)
B Case ii.B
26 else if qMA < qM˜B then
27 Itertype ← MES;
28 NewMetaA← 0;
29 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
30 `MA ← `MA + 1;
31 ˜NewMetaB ← C;
32 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
33 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
34 msg ← dummy message of length r;
B Processing Pauli data
B Case iii.A
35 else if
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
6=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
then
36 Itertype ← PD;
37 RewindExtend ← R;
38 NewMetaA← C;
39 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
40 `MA ← `MA + 1;
41 ˜NewMetaB ← C;
42 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
43 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
44 msg ← dummy message of length r;
B Case iii.B
45 else if (`PA < 3qMA · r) or
(
`P˜B < 3qM˜B · r
)
then
46 Itertype ← PD;
47 RewindExtend ← E;
48 NewMetaA← C;
49 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
50 `MA ← `MA + 1;
51 ˜NewMetaB ← C;
52 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
53 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
54 if `PA < 3qMA · r then
55 msg ← FullPA [`PA + 1, `PA + r]
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Algorithm 4: Preprocess (Alice’s side, cont. from previous page)
B Processing joint quantum state
B Case iv
56 else
57 Itertype ← SIM;
58 computejointstate;
59 FullMA = (FullMA,NewMetaA);
60 `MA ← `MA + 1;
61 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
62 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
63 return Preprocess;
Algorithm 5: rewindMD (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
HMA, `MA, HM˜B, `M˜B, H
′
M˜A
, `′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
MB
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B
)
6=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
, `′MB
)
.
Output: (`MA, `′MB)
1 if `MA 6= `′M˜A or `M˜B 6= `
′
MB then
2 if `MA > `′M˜A then
3 `MA ← `MA − 1;
4 if `M˜B > `
′
MB then
5 `M˜B ← `M˜B − 1;
6 else
7 if HMA 6= H ′M˜A then
8 `MA ← `MA − 1;
9 if HM˜B 6= H ′MB then
10 `M˜B ← `M˜B − 1;
11 return rewindMD;
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Algorithm 6: extendMD (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
`MA, `M˜B, M˜B,msg
′, i
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
, `′MB
)
,
`MA < i− 1 or `M˜B < i− 1.
Output:
(
`MA, M˜B, `M˜B
)
1 if `MA < i− 1 then
2 `MA ← `MA + 2;
3 else if `MA = i− 1 then
4 `MA ← `MA + 1;
5 if `M˜B < i− 1 then
6 M˜B
[
`M˜B + 1, `M˜B + 2
]
← decodeMD (msg′); // decode MD from Σr
7 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 2;
8 else if `M˜B = i− 1 then
9 M˜B ←
(
M˜B,C
)
;
10 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
11 return extendMD;
Algorithm 7: syncMES (Alice’s side)
Input: (FullPA, qMA)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , qMA < qM˜B.
Output: qMA,NewPauliA,FullPA
1 Recall that A′B′C ′ are the registers that are used to generate the joint quantum state of the
protocol being simulated, and C ′ is the communication register;
2 Let E1E2 · · ·Er be the r registers with Alice containing halves of the block of r MESs with
indices in the interval (qMA · r, (qMA + 1) · r] ;
3 Teleport C ′ using E1; then teleport E2 using E3, E4 using E5, and so on (i.e., teleport Ej
using Ej+1 for even j ∈ [r − 2]), and then store Er in register C ′ ;
// See Section 3.3.4 for the rationale, and Bob’s analogue of this step
4 Store the teleportation measurement outcomes in m ∈ Σr;
5 NewPauliA← (m, 0r, 0r);
6 FullPA← (FullPA,NewPauliA);
7 qMA ← qMA + 1;
8 return syncMES;
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Algorithm 8: rewindPD (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
HPA, `PA, HP˜B, `P˜B, H
′
P˜A
, `′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
PB
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , qMA = qM˜B ,
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
6=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
.
Output:
(
`PA, `P˜B
)
1 if `PA 6= `′P˜A or `P˜B 6= `
′
PB then
2 if `PA > `′P˜A then
3 `PA ← `PA − r;
4 if `P˜B > `
′
PB then
5 `P˜B ← `P˜B − r;
6 else
7 if HPA 6= H ′P˜A then
8 `PA ← `PA − r;
9 if HP˜B 6= H ′PB then
10 `P˜B ← `P˜B − r;
11 return rewindPD;
Algorithm 9: extendPD (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
`PA, `P˜B, P˜B, qMA, qM˜B,msg
′
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , qMA = qM˜B ,
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
,
`PA < 3qMA · r or `P˜B < 3qM˜B · r.
Output:
(
`PA, P˜B, `P˜B
)
1 if `PA < 3qMA · r then
2 `PA ← `PA + r;
3 if `P˜B < 3qM˜B · r then
4 P˜B
[
`P˜B + 1 : `P˜B + r
]
← msg′;
5 `P˜B ← `P˜B + r;
6 return extendPD;
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Algorithm 10: Computejointstate (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
FullMA, M˜B,FullPA, P˜B
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
, `′MB
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i− 1 , qMA = qM˜B,
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
,
`PA = `′P˜A = 3qMA · r , `P˜B = `
′
PB = 3qM˜B · r.
Output:
(
JS1A, JS2A,NewMetaA, ˜NewMetaB,Block,RewindExtend,PCorr, P˜Corr
)
1 Compute JS1A;
2 Compute JS2A;
3 Compute NewMetaA;
4 Compute RewindExtend;
5 Compute ˜NewMetaB;
6 Compute Block;
7 Compute PCorr;
8 Compute P˜Corr;
// Refer to Sections 3.3.5, 3.3.6 to see how these variables are computed
9 return Computejointstate;
Algorithm 11: simulate (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
qMA,FullPA, `PA, P˜B, `P˜B,RewindExtend,NewMetaA,Block,PCorr, P˜Corr
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B, qMA
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1, qM˜B
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i,
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
,
`PA = `P˜B = 3qMA · r
Output:
(
FullPA, `PA, P˜B, `P˜B
)
1 Continue the simulation of the input protocol according to Block, NewMetaA and PCorr;
2 Record all teleportation measurement outcomes in α;
3 Record all received Bob’s teleportation measurement outcomes in β;
4 NewPauliA← (α, β,PCorr);
5 FullPA← (FullPA,NewPauliA);
6 `PA ← `PA + 3r;
7 ˜NewPauliB ←
(
β, α, P˜Corr
)
;
8 P˜B ←
(
P˜B, ˜NewPauliB
)
;
9 `P˜B ← `P˜B + 3r;
10 qMA ← qMA + 1;
11 return simulate;
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3.5 Analysis
In order to show the correctness of the above algorithm, we condition on some view of the metadata
and Pauli data, i.e., FullMA, MA, M˜A, FullMB, MB, M˜B, FullPA, PA, P˜A, FullPB, PB and P˜B.
We define a potential function Φ as
Φ def= ΦQ + ΦMD + ΦPD ,
where ΦMD and ΦPD measure the correctness of the two parties’ current estimate of each other’s
metadata and Pauli data, respectively, and ΦQ measures the progress in reproducing the joint state
of the input protocol. We define
md+A
def= the length of the longest prefix where MA and M˜A agree; (13)
md+B
def= the length of the longest prefix where MB and M˜B agree; (14)
md−A
def= max{`MA, `M˜A} −md
+
A; (15)
md−B
def= max{`MB, `M˜B} −md
+
B ; (16)
pd+A
def= b1
r
× the length of the longest prefix where PA and P˜A agreec; (17)
pd+B
def= b1
r
× the length of the longest prefix where PB and P˜B agreec; (18)
pd−A
def= 1
r
max{`PA, `P˜A} − pd
+
A; (19)
pd−B
def= 1
r
max{`PB, `P˜B} − pd
+
B . (20)
Also, recall that
g
def= the number of good unitary blocks in JS2, (21)
b
def= the number of bad unitary blocks in JS2, and (22)
u
def= |qMA − qMB|, (23)
with qMA and qMB the number of non-C iterations for Alice and Bob, respectively.
Now we are ready to define the components of the potential function. At the end of the i-th
iteration, we let
ΦQ
def= g − b− 5u, (24)
ΦMD
def= md+A − 3md−A +md+B − 3md−B − 2i, (25)
ΦPD
def= pd+A − pd−A + pd+B − pd−B − 3qMA − 3qMB, (26)
Φ def= ΦQ + ΦMD + ΦPD. (27)
where g, b and and u are defined in Eqs. (21), (22), and (23).
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Lemma 3.4. Throughout the algorithm, it holds that
• ΦMD ≤ 0 with equality if and only if Alice and Bob have full knowledge of each other’s metadata,
i.e., md+A = md
+
B = i and md
−
A = md
−
B = 0.
• ΦPD ≤ 0 with equality if and only if Alice and Bob have full knowledge of each other’s Pauli
data, i.e., pd+A = 3qMA, pd
+
B = 3qMB and pd
−
A = pd
−
B = 0.
Proof. The first statement follows from the property that md+A,md
+
B ≤ i, and the second statement
holds since pd+A ≤ 3qMA and pd+B ≤ 3qMB.
Note that if g−b−u ≥ n/2r, the noiseless protocol embedding described in Section 2.1.1, guarantees
that not only is the correct final state of the original protocol produced and swapped into the safe
registers A˜, B˜ and C˜, but also they remain untouched by the bad and ugly blocks of the simulation.
Therefore, by Lemma 3.4, for successful simulation of an n-round protocol it suffices to have
Φ ≥ n/2r, at the end of the simulation.
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 3.1 (Restated). Consider any n-round alternating communication protocol Π in the
teleportation-based model, communicating messages over a noiseless channel with an alphabet Σ of
bit-size Θ (logn). Algorithm 3 is a computationally efficient coding scheme which given Π, simulates
it with probability at least 1− 2−Θ(n), over any fully adversarial error channel with alphabet Σ and
error rate . The simulation uses n (1 + Θ (
√
)) rounds of communication, and therefore achieves
a communication rate of 1 − Θ (√). Furthermore. the computational complexity of the coding
operations is O
(
n2
)
.
Proof Outline. We prove that any iteration without an error or hash collision increases the
potential by at least one while any iteration with error or hash collision reduces the potential by
at most some fixed constant. As in Ref. [Hae14], with very high probability the number of hash
collisions is at most O(n), the same order of magnitude as the number of errors, therefore negligible.
Finally, our choice of the total number of iterations, Rtotal
def= dn/2r + κne (for a sufficiently large
constant κ), guarantees an overall potential increase of at least n/2r. As explained above, this
suffices to prove successful simulation of the input protocol.
Lemma 3.5. Each iteration of the Main Algorithm (Algorithm 3) without a hash collision or error
increases the potential Φ by at least 1.
Proof. Note that in an iteration with no error or hash collision, Alice and Bob agree on the iteration
type. Moreover, if Itertype = MD or PD (Case i or iii), they also agree on whether they extend or
rewind the data (the subcase A or B), and if Itertype = MES (Case ii), then exactly one of them
is in Case A and the other one is in Case B. We analyze the potential function in each of the cases,
keeping in mind that we only encounter Case ii or later cases once the metadata of the two parties
are consistent and of full length, and similarly, that we encounter Case iv once the parties have
used the same number of MESs and the Pauli data with the two parties are consistent and of full
length. Lemma 3.4 guarantees that ΦMD becomes 0 on entering Case ii, and that ΦMD = ΦPD = 0
on entering Case iv.
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• Alice and Bob are in Case i.A:
– ΦPD and ΦQ stay the same.
– i increases by 1.
– md+A and md
+
B stay the same.
– None of md−A and md
−
B increases, and at least one decreases by 1.
Therefore, ΦMD increases at least by 3− 2 = 1, and so does Φ.
• Alice and Bob are in Case i.B:
– ΦPD and ΦQ stay the same.
– i increases by 1.
– md−A and md
−
B stay at 0.
– At least one of `MA or `MB is smaller than i− 1; If only `MA < i− 1, then md+A increases
by 2, and md+B by 1. The case where only `MB < i− 1 is similar. If both are smaller than
i− 1, then md+A and md+B both increase by 2.
Therefore, ΦMD increases by at least 3− 2 = 1, and so does Φ.
• Alice is in Case ii.A, Bob is in Case ii.B:
– ΦMD stays at 0.
– qMB increases by 1.
– qMA, pd+A, pd
−
A, pd
+
B , pd
−
B all stay the same.
– g remains the same, b increases by at most 1, and u decreases by 1.
Therefore, ΦQ increases by at least 5− 1 = 4, and ΦPD decreases by 3. So Φ increases by at
least 1.
• Alice is in Case ii.B, Bob is in Case ii.A: This case is similar to the above one.
• Alice and Bob are in Case iii.A
– ΦMD stays at 0, and ΦQ stays the same
– pd+A, pd
+
B , qMA and qMB stay the same.
– None of pd−A and pd
−
B increases, and at least one decreases by 1.
Therefore, ΦPD increases by at least 1, and so does Φ.
• Alice and Bob are in Case iii.B
– ΦMD stays at 0, and ΦQ stays the same.
– pd−A, pd
−
B stay at 0, and qMA, qMB stay the same.
– At least one of the following holds: `PA < 3qMA · r, in which case pd+A increases by
1 (otherwise it remains unchanged), or `PB < 3qMB · r, and then pd+B increases by 1
(otherwise it remains unchanged).
Therefore, ΦPD increases by at least 1, and so does Φ.
• Alice and Bob are in Case iv
– ΦMD and ΦPD stay at 0.
– u stays at 0
– Either g stays the same and b decreases by 1 (when b 6= 0) or b stays at 0 and g increases
by 1.
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Therefore, ΦQ increases by 1, and so does Φ.
Hence Φ increases at least by 1 for each iteration of the algorithm without a hash collision or error.
Lemma 3.6. Each iterations of Algorithm 3, regardless of the number of hash collisions and errors,
decreases the potential Φ by at most 45.
Proof. At each step, i increases by 1 while, in the worst case, g, md+A,md
+
B , pd
+
A and pd
+
B decrease
by at most 1, b, u, qMA and qMB increase by at most 1, md−A and md
−
B increase by at most 3 and
pd−A and pd
−
B increase by at most 4. Hence, ΦQ, ΦMD and ΦPD decrease at most by 7, 22, and 16,
respectively. So in total, Φ decreases by at most 45.
The following lemma is from [Hae14].
Lemma 3.7. The number of iterations of Algorithm 3 suffering from a hash collision is at most
6n with probability at least 1− 2−Θ(n).
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Let Rtotal = d n2re + 368n. The total number of iterations is less than 2n,
so the total number of iterations with an error is at most 2n. By Lemma 3.7, with probability
at least 1 − 2−Θ(n), the number of iterations with a hash collision is at most 6n. Therefore, by
Lemma 3.5, in the remaining Rtotal− 8n = d n2re+ 360n iterations, the potential Φ increases by at
least one. The potential decreases only when there is an error or hash collision and it decreases by
at most 45. So at the end of the simulation, we have
g − b− u ≥ ΦQ ≥ Φ ≥ Rtotal − 8n− 45× 8n ≥ n2r .
Hence the simulation is successful. Furthermore, note that the of amount communication in each
iteration is independent of the iteration type and is always 2r + Θ(1) symbols: in every iteration
each party sends Θ(1) symbols to communicate the hash values and the lengths of the metadata
and Pauli data in line 9 of Algorithm 3; each party sends another r symbols, either in line 13 of
Algorithm 3, if Itertype 6= SIM or in Algorithm 11 to communicate the teleportation measurement
outcomes. So the total number of communicated symbols is
Rtotal · (2r + Θ(1)) =
(
d n2r e+ Θ(n)
)
(2r + Θ(1)) = n(1 + Θ(
√
)), (28)
as claimed.
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4 Recycling-based protocol via quantum channel with large alpha-
bet
4.1 Overview
4.1.1 Teleportation is inapplicable
Switching from the teleportation-based model to the plain quantum model, suppose we are given
a protocol Π using noiseless quantum communication, and we are asked to provide a protocol
Π′ using noisy quantum channels under the strongly adversarial model described earlier. In the
absence of free entanglement, how can we protect quantum data from leaking to the environment
without incurring a non-negligible overhead? First, note that some form of protection is necessary,
as discussed in Section 1.2. Second, teleportation would be too expensive to use, since it incurs an
overhead of at least 3: we have to pay for the MES as well as the classical communication required.
Surprisingly, an old and relatively unknown idea called the Quantum Vernam Cipher (QVC) [Leu02]
turns out to be a perfect alternative method to protect quantum data with negligible overhead as
the noise rate approaches 0.
4.1.2 Quantum Vernam Cipher (QVC)
Suppose Alice and Bob share two copies of MESs, each over two d-dimensional systems. For Alice to
send a message to Bob, she applies a controlled-X operation with her half of the first MES as control,
and the message as the target. She applies a controlled-Z operation from her half of the second
MES to the message. When Bob receives the message, he reverses the controlled operations using
his halves of the MESs. The operations are similar for the opposite direction of communication. A
detailed description is provided in Section 2.5.2.
QVC is designed so that given access to an authenticated classical channel from Alice to Bob, Bob
can determine and correct any error in the transmission of the quantum message. This can simply
be done by measuring Zl type changes to one half of the two MES. They can also run QVC many
times to send multiple messages and determine the errors in a large block using a method called
“random hashing”, and recycle the MESs if the error rate (as defined in our adversarial model) is low.
This is a crucial property of QVC and leads to one of the earliest (quantum) key recycling results
known. What makes QVC particularly suitable for our problem is that encoding and decoding are
performed message-wise, while error detection can be done in large blocks, and entanglement can
be recycled if no error is detected. It may thus be viewed as a natural quantum generalization to
Haeupler’s consistency checks.
As an aside, in Appendix E of Ref. [Leu02], the relative merits of teleportation and QVC were
compared (those are the only two ciphers with complete quantum reliability), and it was determined
that entanglement generation over an insecure noisy quantum channel followed by teleportation is
more entanglement efficient than QVC with entanglement recycling in some test settings. However,
this difference vanishes for low noise. Furthermore, the comparison assumes authenticated noiseless
classical communication to be free. QVC requires an amount of classical communication for the
consistency checks which vanishes with the noise parameter (but this cost was not a concern in that
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study). Furthermore, QVC was also proposed as an authentication scheme, but the requirement for
interaction to authenticate and to recycle the key or entanglement was considered a disadvantage,
compared to non-interactive schemes. (Those are only efficient for large block length, and cannot
identify the error when one is detected. So, these authentication schemes are inapplicable). We
thus provide renewed insight into QVC when interaction is natural (while it is considered expensive
in many other settings).
4.1.3 Entanglement recycling and adaptations of QVC for the current problem
In the current scenario, we have neither free MESs nor an authenticated classical channel. Instead,
Alice and Bob start the protocol by distributing the MESs they need, using a high rate quantum error
correcting code over the low-noise channel. Then, they run the input protocol Π as is over the noisy
channel, while frequently checking for errors by performing quantum hashing [BDSW96, Leu02],
using the same noisy quantum channel instead of an authenticated classical channel. If they detect
an inconsistency, assuming that the errors are most likely recent, they measure a small block of
MESs in the recent past to determine the errors. They continue this process until they get matching
quantum hash values indicating (with constant probability) that they have located and identified all
the errors and the remaining MESs can be recycled and reused to encrypt the messages. Frequent
quantum hashing allows Alice and Bob to boost their confidence about recyclability of the earlier
MESs and reuse MESs in a cyclic way. Note that for successful simulation it is crucial to ensure
that the recycled MESs are indeed not corrupted and that Alice and Bob recycle the same sequence
of MESs. One of our main contributions in this section is developing a framework for recycling
entanglement in a communication efficient way. We show that entanglement generation of O (n
√
)
MESs, where n is the length of the input protocol Π and  is the noise parameter, is sufficient to
last through the whole simulation.
4.1.4 Framework
As in the case of the teleportation-based protocols, due to transmission errors and collisions, Alice
and Bob do not necessarily always agree on their actions in the simulation. Therefore, in every
iteration both parties need to obtain a global view of the history of the simulation so far to correctly
decide their next actions. They achieve this goal by maintaining a similar data structure as in the
teleportation-based case. The data structure now contains additional information to keep track of
their measurements, which Alice and Bob use in the recycling process.
4.1.5 Additional out-of-sync problems
Due to transmission errors introduced by the adversary, Alice and Bob may get out of sync in QVC.
In such a scenario, the QVC operations are performed by only one party and the quantum data
intended to be sent to the other party leaks into the MES registers used to encrypt the messages.
Furthermore, the parties may not agree on the subset of MESs they have already measured when
they perform quantum hashing. As we will explain in Section 4.3.4, in the worst case, this can
further lead to the leakage of the quantum data into all the MES registers involved in the quantum
hashing procedure.
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We show that, surprisingly, once again the quantum data can be recovered once Alice and Bob
reconcile the differences in the data structure developed for the task. This is in spite of the fact
that there is no reason to expect out-of-sync QVC to be sufficient to protect the quantum data
from leaking to the environment when encoding and decoding operations are performed incorrectly
and quantum data is sent via the noisy quantum channel.
4.2 Result
Our main result in the plain quantum model with polynomial-size communication alphabet is
the simulation of an n-round noiseless communication protocol over a fully adversarial channel of
error-rate  defined in Section 2.1.2.
Theorem 4.1. Consider any n-round alternating communication protocol Π in the plain quantum
model, communicating messages over a noiseless channel with an alphabet Σ of bit-size Θ (logn).
Algorithm 13 is a quantum coding scheme which given Π, simulates it with probability at least
1−2−Θ(n), over any fully adversarial error channel with alphabet Σ and error rate . The simulation
uses n (1 + Θ (
√
)) rounds of communication, and therefore achieves a communication rate of
1−Θ (√).
4.3 Description of Protocol
4.3.1 General Description
Our simulation of noiseless protocols in the plain quantum model of communication proceeds
using the same idea of running O (1) rounds of the input protocol as is, while checking if the
adversary has corrupted the communication during the previous iterations and if necessary, actively
rewinding the simulation to correct errors. The quantum messages are protected using QVC against
corruptions by the adversary. In order to detect potential transmission errors, the MES pairs
used as the key in QVC may be measured after each communication round. The measurement
outcomes may be stored and later on compared to obtain the error syndrome. Therefore, using a
data structure similar to the one introduced in the previous section, one can obtain a coding scheme
for simulating any protocol in the plain quantum model. However, this approach is not efficient
in using the entanglement. Recall that in the plain quantum model, the parties do not pre-share
any entanglement, hence they need to establish the shared MESs through extra communication.
Rather than measuring the MES pairs immediately after each round of communication, we use the
quantum hashing procedure described in Section 4.3.2 to check whether any transmission error
has occurred so far. Note that if Alice and Bob detect an error, they need to determine the error
and eventually actively rewind the simulation to correct it and resume the simulation from there.
However, similar to the teleportation-based protocol, due to transmission errors Alice and Bob
may not always agree on how they proceed with the simulation in every iteration. Thus, in every
iteration before taking further actions, each party needs to know the actions of the other party so
far. More accurately, they first need to obtain a global view of their joint quantum state. Alice
and Bob locally maintain a similar data structure as in the teleportation-based protocol containing
metadata and Pauli data, which needs to be synchronized in the algorithm. They first need to
ensure they have full knowledge of each other’s metadata. Then similar to the teleportation-based
45
case, in order to avoid out-of-sync scenarios in communication using QVC, it is crucial for them
to synchronize the number of MESs they have used (see Section 4.3.3). We denote by `AQVC and
`BQVC, the number of blocks of MES pairs used by Alice and Bob, respectively. After ensuring
`AQVC = `BQVC (to the best of their knowledge), they compare their quantum hash values to check for
errors. Note that quantum hashing does not indicate in which round of communication the error
has occurred. If the hash values do not match, they measure the last block of MES pairs which has
not gained as much trust as the older blocks through quantum hashing. This effectively collapses
the adversary’s action on this block to Pauli errors. The effective errors can be determined jointly
from the measurement outcomes, which are recorded by Alice and Bob as part of their local Pauli
data. Otherwise, if the hashes do match, then Alice and Bob synchronize their Pauli data. Note
that similar to the teleportation-based protocol, the Pauli corrections performed by Alice and Bob
are also recorded as part of the Pauli data. Together with the metadata, this gives Alice and Bob
all the information they need to compute their estimate of the current joint state. Hence, they can
determine how to proceed with the simulation next.
Recycling entanglement and recycling data. An important complication arising in simula-
tion of protocols in the plain quantum model is that in order to achieve the simulation rate of
1 − Θ(√), we cannot afford to access a new MES pair in every round of communication using
QVC. This is where we use a crucial property of QVC, namely the key recycling property. Note
that in communication using QVC if no error occurs on the message then the pair of MESs used
will remain intact, hence they can be recycled and used in later rounds. Otherwise, at some point
Alice and Bob need to measure the MES pair to get the error syndrome, in which case the pair
cannot be recycled. By performing quantum hashing regularly and carefully keeping track of the
measured MES blocks, Alice and Bob can recycle MES pairs as needed and run the simulation by
establishing a smaller number of MESs at the beginning of the protocol.
In order to correctly simulate the input protocol we need to ensure that the recycling is successful
in every iteration, namely that the same sequences of MES blocks are recycled by the two parties
and that they are indeed not corrupted when being recycled. Note that if the two parties reuse
an MES pair which has been corrupted due to an earlier transmission error in QVC, then even if
Alice and Bob detect the error and measure the MES pair, they have no way of knowing whether
the error has occurred the last time the MES pair were used or in an earlier round. Moreover, if a
block of MES pairs has been locally measured by only one party, say Alice, then the other party,
Bob, needs to measure the block and avoid this block when encrypting future messages using QVC.
In order to achieve successful recycling, we modify the metadata so that it contains additional
information to keep track of each party’s measurements. Alice maintains a string RA ∈ {S,M}∗,
where each M symbol corresponds to a measured MES block and S is used for an MES block still
in superposition. In each iteration, Alice finds the next reusable MES block, records the index of
the block in a string, IndexA, of recycled MESs and concatenates RA with a new S symbol. The
string IndexA serves as Alice’s queue of reusable MES blocks. Moreover, if she measures an MES
block in the current iteration, she changes the corresponding S symbol in RA to M. Similarly, Bob
maintains the strings RB and IndexB. Note that the recycled MES blocks are not necessarily reused
immediately or even in the same iteration by the two parties.
Alice and Bob need to ensure that the strings RA and RB are the same. Using her full-length
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estimate M˜B of Bob’s metadata FullMB, Alice computes an estimate R˜B of RB. Note that if
M˜B = FullMB then R˜B = RB. Similarly, Bob computes his estimate R˜A of RA from his full-length
estimate M˜A of Alice’s metadata FullMA. After synchronizing their metadata and ensuring that
they have used the same number of MES blocks, they synchronize their recycling data. Alice
recycles MES blocks using RA and IndexA and Bob using RB and IndexB. Frequent hashing of
the metadata allows them to be highly confident that their recycling data agree in a sufficiently
long prefix. Furthermore, quantum hashing ensures that with high probability all the recycled MES
blocks are indeed reusable.
Note that the synchronization of the recycling data is slightly different from the synchronization of
the metadata and the Pauli data. For the latter, Alice and Bob just need to know each other’s local
data, i.e., Alice needs to know FullMB and FullPB and Bob needs to know FullMA and FullPA
and the corresponding data need not be the same. Whereas for the recycling data, Alice and Bob
need to learn each other’s data and match them, i.e., they need to ensure RA = RB.
Entanglement distribution. At the outset of the simulation, Alice and Bob use the Robust
Entanglement Distribution protocol (Algorithm 1) introduced in Section 2.3 to share Θ(n
√
) copies
of the MES
∣∣φ0,0〉, defined in Definition 2.2. The shared MESs are used as follows:
• Θ (n√) MESs are used in pairs to serve as the key for encryption of messages using QVC.
They are divided into LQVC = Θ (n) blocks of 2r MES pairs, where r = Θ( 1√). In each
block the MES pairs are implicitly numbered from 1 to 2r. The odd-numbered pairs are used
in QVC to send messages from Alice to Bob and the even-numbered pairs are used to send
messages from Bob to Alice.
• Θ(n√) MESs are reserved to be used in quantum hashing.
• The remaining Θ(n√) MESs are measured in the computational basis by both parties to
obtain a common random string to be used as the seed for classical and quantum hashing.
We show that with the limited error budget of the adversary, the Θ(n
√
) MESs established at the
beginning of simulation are sufficient to successfully simulate the input protocol. This allows us to
achieve a simulation rate of 1−Θ(√).
4.3.2 Quantum Hashing
By performing local measurements on the MES pairs used as the keys for encrypting the messages in
QVC and comparing the measurement outcomes on both sides, one can extract the error syndrome
corresponding to the corruptions introduced over the noisy communication channel. As explained in
the previous subsection, although this allows the two parties to detect errors immediately, it is not
efficient for our application. In Subsection 2.5.2, we introduced an error detection procedure which
allows the parties to check for corruptions when QVC is used over several rounds of communication
to send multiple messages at the cost of losing only one MES which is measured at the end. However,
this error detection procedure is not directly useful in our application since the adversary can always
choose the corruptions in a way that makes it impossible for Alice and Bob to detect errors; see
subsection 2.5.2. Instead, Alice and Bob use the quantum hashing procedure described below to
check whether there is an undetected error. To avoid the adversary from hiding her corruptions
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Figure 6: These figures represent the blocks of MES pairs at different stages of the protocol.
To simplify the figure, we represent each block by a single MES. Note that these are used in a
circular pattern, corresponding to recycling some of the previously used blocks of MES pairs. Those
depicted as circles are assumed to be good and usable for QVC, those depicted by squares have
been measured already in order to extract the error syndrome. Figure (a) represent the MES blocks
at the beginning of the protocol, when none have been measured. Figure (b) represents them when
Alice and Bob agree on which ones have been measured and have used the same amount of them
for QVC, which is the desired state. Figure (c) represents a situation when Alice and Bob have
gotten out-of-sync, e.g., Alice has measured some blocks that Bob has not (and maybe used QVC
more often than Bob). They then work to get back in sync before resuming the simulation.
from the detection procedure above, Alice and Bob choose a random subset of the MESs and try
to detect errors in this subset rather than all MESs used in QVC. More precisely, quantum hashing
involves the following steps in our algorithm. At the beginning of the i-th iteration, Alice and
Bob pick a fresh MES serving as the control system used in the error detection procedure. Recall
that Alice and Bob locally maintain the strings IndexA and IndexB, respectively, corresponding
to their recycled MES blocks. Alice uses the shared randomness established at the outset of the
protocol to choose a random subset of the MES registers contained in the blocks specified by
IndexA
[
i− t+ 1 : `AQVC
]
, for t ∈ Θ (n). Using her recycling data RA, she locally determines the
MESs in this random subset which she has not measured already. She performs her operations
in the detection procedure described in Subsection 2.5.2 only on these MESs. Bob does the same
locally, based on IndexB and RB. Alice and Bob store their measurement outcomes in QHA
and QHB, respectively, and exchange the values. We prove that except with exponentially small
probability, recycling is successful throughout the execution of the algorithm. Therefore we can
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assume IndexA = IndexB in every iteration. But RA and RB do not necessarily match in every
iteration. Therefore, in some iterations, Alice and Bob may perform the quantum hashing on
different subsets of the MESs. Moreover, if the two parties are not synchronized in the number
of MES blocks they have used , they might perform quantum hashing on an MES that is only
used by one party but not the other. We discuss these out-of-sync quantum hashing scenarios in
Subsection 4.3.4.
Alice and Bob compare their quantum hash values only when they believe they have full knowledge
of each other’s metadata, have used the same number of MES blocks and agree on their recycling
data. If they get the same hash values, they assume no error has occurred. Otherwise, they believe
they have detected an error. Note that similar to all other types of data that are communicated
over the noisy channel, the quantum hash values may get corrupted by the adversary. We say a
quantum hash collision has occurred in an iteration only when recycling has been successful so far,
Alice and Bob are indeed synchronized in their metadata, the number of MES blocks they have
used and their recycling data and QHA = QHB despite the fact that there are non-measured MES
blocks in the last t blocks of IndexA = IndexB, which are not in the
∣∣φ0,0〉⊗4r state.
The following lemma shows that in every iteration of the algorithm, assuming successful recycling
up to that point, the probability of a quantum hash collision is at most 1/2.
Lemma 4.2. Let m ∈ N and k = k1 . . . km ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}m. Suppose that Alice and Bob
share the states
∣∣φ0,0〉A0B0 , ∣∣∣φ0,k1〉A1B1 , . . . ,
∣∣∣φ0,km〉
AmBm
and a random variable S distributed over
{0, 1}m, interpreted as a subset of [m]. Alice and Bob apply c-XA0Ai and c-XB0Bi, for all i ∈ S.
Then they apply the quantum Fourier transform operator F and its inverse F† on A0 and B0,
respectively. They measure the registers in the computational basis with outcomes QHA and QHB,
respectively. Then for k = 0m, independent of the random variable S, we have
Pr[QHA = QHB] = 1 .
Moreover, for uniformly random S, for all k 6= 0m, we have
Pr[QHA = QHB] ≤ 12 .
Proof. Let S = S1S2 . . . Sm. By Lemma 2.13, the state in register A0B0 before the measurements is(
F⊗ F†
) ∣∣∣φ0,−∑mi=1 Siki〉
A0B0
=
(
FZ−
∑m
i=1 Siki ⊗ F†
) ∣∣∣φ0,0〉 = (FZ−∑mi=1 SikiF† ⊗ 1) ∣∣∣φ0,0〉
=
(
X−
∑m
i=1 Siki ⊗ 1
) ∣∣∣φ0,0〉 = ∣∣∣φ−∑mi=1 Siki,0〉 ,
where the first and the last equality follow from Definition 2.2; the second equality holds by
Proposition 2.4 and the fact that F = FT . The third equality follows from Proposition 2.1. Hence
Pr[QHA = QHB] = Pr
[∑
Siki = 0 mod d
]
.
If k = 0m then the above probability equals 1. Suppose that k is non-zero in a non-empty subset J
of coordinates in [m]. Consider the set Z of all s ∈ {0, 1}m such that ∑ siki = 0 mod d. Note that
the minimum Hamming distance of elements of Z restricted to J is at least 2, since otherwise there
exists j ∈ J such that d divides kj , contradicting kj ∈ [d− 1]. Fix j ∈ J and let ej ∈ {0, 1}m be
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the string which is 1 in the j-th coordinate and zero everywhere else. For every s ∈ Z, the string
s+ ej is not in Z. Therefore, |Z| ≤ 2m−1 and for S uniformly distributed over {0, 1}m we have
Pr
[∑
Siki = 0 mod d
]
≤ 12 .
Note that the above bound is tight when |J | = 1. Finally, by Lemma 2.13 the state in the registers
A1B1, . . . , AmBm remains unchanged.
In order to reduce the collision probability to a smaller constant, quantum hashing may be repeated
for a constant number of times in every iteration with fresh control MESs and independent random
subsets S.
Classical seeds needed for quantum hashing. Alice and Bob perform quantum hashing and
communicate the hash values in every iteration but they only compare their hash values in a subset
of iterations. We choose to do so in order to avoid the two parties from getting out-of-sync on
which MES register to use in quantum hashing. As the hashing procedure only consumes a constant
number of MESs in each iteration, the total number of MESs used in quantum hashing in the entire
simulation is Θ (Rtotal) = Θ (n
√
), and they constitute a constant fraction of the MESs distributed
at the outset of the protocol; see Subsection 4.3.1. On the other hand, generating independent
Θ (rt)-bit seeds, with r ∈ Θ (1/√) and t ∈ Θ (n), for each of the Rtotal iterations would require
Θ
(
n2
)
bits of shared randomness. The shared randomness is obtained by measuring a fraction of
the MESs established at the beginning of the algorithm. Even in the large-alphabet case, sharing
Θ
(
n2
)
bits of randomness would require too much communication.
To circumvent this obstacle Alice and Bob start with a smaller number of i.i.d. random bits and
extend them to a much longer pseudo-random string. In more detail, they measure Θ (n
√
) MESs
in the computational basis and record the binary representation of the outcomes in R′. Then they
each use the deterministic algorithm of Lemma 2.10 with δ = 2−Θ(n
√
), to obtain a shared δ-biased
string R′ of length Θ (rtRtotal) = Θ
(
n2
)
. The following lemma bounds the collision probability
when instead of a uniformly random seed, a δ-biased seed is used in quantum hashing. Note that
in our application of Lemma 4.3, we have m = O (rt) = O (n
√
).
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that the random variable S in Lemma 4.2 is δ-biased. Then for all k 6= 0m,
we have
Pr[QHA = QHB] ≤ 12 + 2
m/2δ .
Proof. Let U denote the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m and Z be the subset of all s ∈ {0, 1}m
such that ∑ siki = 0 mod d. By Propositions 2.8 and 2.9, we have
|U(Z)− S(Z)| ≤ 12‖U − S‖1 ≤
1
2 × 2
m/2‖U − S‖2 ≤ 2m/2δ .
Therefore, by Lemma 4.2, we have
Pr[QHA = QHB] = Pr
[∑
Siki = 0 mod d
]
= S(Z) ≤ 12 + 2
m/2δ .
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4.3.3 Out-of-Sync Quantum Vernam Cipher
Consider the scenario where Alice, based on her view of the simulation so far, implements a +1
block, while Bob believes their classical data are not consistent and therefore implements a C
iteration. Alice simulates a block of the input protocol Π while using the next block of MES pairs
in the queue IndexA to encrypt her messages using QVC. At the same time, Bob tries to reconcile
the inconsistency through classical communication and does not send his messages using QVC.
In this scenario, they also interpret the messages they receive incorrectly. Alice believes Bob is
also encrypting his messages using QVC and she applies QVC decoding operations and her Pauli
corrections on Bob’s messages. Moreover, she potentially applies unitary operations of the input
protocol on her local registers. Meanwhile, Bob treats Alice’s messages as classical information
about the data he believes they need to synchronize. More importantly, since he does not perform
the QVC operations (decoding operations in odd rounds and encoding operations in even rounds)
on his side, in each round the corresponding MES pair becomes entangled with the message register.
So crucial information for continuing the simulation spreads to multiple registers. Moreover, this
scenario could continue for several iterations. Nonetheless, we provide a simple way to redirect the
quantum information back to the ABC registers, while effectively reducing this type of error to
corruptions introduced in the joint state due to transmission errors by the adversary. Once reduced
to such errors, Alice and Bob can actively rewind the incorrect part of the simulation and resume
from there.
As explained earlier, the first step for Alice and Bob is to ensure they have full knowledge of each
other’s metadata. Once they both achieve this goal, they discover the discrepancy in the number
of MES blocks they have used. Suppose Bob has used fewer blocks of MES pairs than Alice, i.e.,
`AQVC > `
B
QVC and he discovers this at the beginning of the i-th iteration. Let E1E2 . . . E4r be the
registers with Bob containing halves of the 4r MESs in the first MES block that Alice has used,
say in the i′-th iteration, but Bob has not so far. Note that in iteration i′, Alice has used the MES
pairs corresponding to E1E2, E5E6, . . . , E4r−3E4r−2 on her side to encrypt quantum information
using QVC and she has performed QVC decoding operations on Bob’s messages and her marginal
of MES pairs corresponding to E3E4, E7E8, . . . , E4r−1E4r. In the i-th iteration, Alice and Bob
both send dummy messages to each other. Let C1, C2, . . . , Cr denote the r message registers sent
from Alice to Bob after communication over the noisy channel. For every j ∈ [r], upon receiving
Cj , Bob applies QVC decoding operations on Cj and E4j−3E4j−2, and then applies QVC encoding
operations on Cj and E4j−1E4j , i.e., he applies
(c-Z)E4jCj (c-X)E4j−1Cj
(
c-X−1
)
E4j−3Cj
(
c-Z−1
)
E4j−2Cj
,
and then he discards the message register Cj . The effect of these operations is the same as if Alice
and Bob had both used the MES block in sync, i.e., in the i′-th iteration, except the following also
happened independently of channel error :
1. Alice’s messages in the i′-th iteration were replaced by C1, . . . , Cr and Bob applied his QVC
decoding operations on these dummy messages rather than the messages Alice intended to
communicate,
2. the unitary operations used by Bob on the registers BC were all identity, and
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3. Bob’s messages were replaced by his messages of the i′-th iteration and Alice’s QVC decoding
operations were applied on these (classical) messages.
The above procedure redirects the quantum information leaked to the MES registers back to the
ABC registers, while introducing errors which act exactly the same as transmission errors introduced
by the adversary. As in the case of corruptions by the adversary, once Alice and Bob measure
the MES block, the error collapses to a Pauli error which can be determined by comparing the
measurement outcomes by Alice and Bob. We choose to perform the measurements at the end of
the i-th iteration, rather than leaving the algorithm to detect the error through quantum hashing
(as in the case of transmission errors).
4.3.4 Out-of-Sync Quantum Hashing
Consider the scenario in which Alice and Bob have used the same number of MES blocks for
communication using QVC but have measured different subsets of MES blocks. Suppose that
when they perform quantum hashing, the random subset of MESs they choose contains an MES in
registers A1B1, which has been measured by only one party, say Alice. Let VAVB be the registers
used as the control registers by Alice and Bob in quantum hashing. Alice and Bob compare their
quantum hash values only if they believe they have measured the same subset of MES blocks.
Therefore, if they compare their hash values in this iteration, it is due to a transmission error
or a metadata hash collision. Note that in this scenario Bob applies a controlled-X operation
on the partially measured MES, while Alice who has measured her marginal does not. Since A1
is already measured by Alice, after Bob’s controlled-X operation the registers A1B1 do not get
entangled with VAVB. However, the state in the VAVB registers will be mapped to
∣∣φ0,a〉, for a
random a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1} corresponding to Alice’s measurement outcome. This (quite probably)
results in Alice and Bob taking incorrect actions from which they can recover once they realize the
inconsistency in their classical data. The algorithm is designed to ensure that the register B1 is
measured by Bob and A1B1 is not reused by the two parties in future iterations. Moreover, Bob’s
controlled-X operation does not change the outcome of his measurement on B1. This ensures that
Alice and Bob can correctly learn any potential error on the message register in the corresponding
communication round once they learn each other’s Pauli data.
A subtler scenario occurs when Alice and Bob perform quantum hashing when they have used
different numbers of MES blocks. Suppose that `AQVC > `BQVC, i.e., Alice has used more MES blocks
and the random subset of MESs they choose for quantum hashing contains an MES which has been
only used on Alice’s side. As explained in the previous section, when QVC operations are performed
only on one side, the MES pair used as the key becomes entangled with the message register and
the quantum information in the message register leaks to these MESs. In the above scenario, once
quantum hashing is done the information leaks into the additional MES used in hashing. Since
the same MES register is used as the control system when applying the c-X operations on all the
MESs in the random subset, the information may leak even further into those registers as well.
Surprisingly, the simple solution we provided to recover from out-of-sync QVC resolves this issue as
well. The first measure we need to take is to ensure quantum hashing is performed in a sequential
way on the MESs in the random subset, starting from the MES used earliest to the latest one. This
ensures that the states in the MES registers which have been used both by Alice and Bob do not
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get disturbed. However, the remaining MESs in the random subset become entangled with the
additional MES used in hashing and potentially each other. We need to ensure that these MES
registers are not reused in future iterations. Once the two parties synchronize their metadata and
realize that they are out of sync on the number of MESs they have used, Bob completes QVC
on his side as described in the previous section and immediately measures his marginal of the
MES block. This ensures that he will never reuse this block in future iterations. The algorithm
is designed so that by the time Alice needs to decide whether to recycle this MES block or not,
she will have measured her marginal of the MES registers. We prove that except with probability
2−Θ(n) recycling is successful in all iterations and such a block of MES registers is never recycled.
Despite the fact that quantum hashing is performed before Bob completes the QVC operations
on his side, this procedure has the same effect as if Bob had completed QVC before the quantum
hashing was performed. To understand this phenomenon, consider the following simpler scenario.
Suppose that Alice and Bob share 3 copies of the MES
∣∣φ0,0〉 in registers A1B1, A2B2 and VAVB.
Alice uses the MES pair in registers A1B1 and A2B2 as the key to encrypt a message in register C
using QVC and sends the message register to Bob. Suppose that the adversary applies the Pauli
error XaZb on the message register for some a, b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}. Now suppose that before Bob
applies his QVC decoding operations, Alice applies c-X on VAA1 with VA being the control system.
Then their joint state is(
c-X−1
)
B1C
(
c-Z−1
)
B2C
(c-X)VAA1
(
XaZb
)
C
(c-Z)A2C (c-X)A1C∣∣∣φ0,0〉
VAVB
∣∣∣φ0,0〉
A1B1
∣∣∣φ0,0〉
A2B2
|ψ〉C .
Note that (c-X)VAA1 commutes with Bob’s QVC decoding operation (c-Z)A2C (c-X)A1C . Therefore,
by Equation (5) their joint state is given by
(c-X)VAA1
(
XaZb
)
C
∣∣∣φ0,0〉
VAVB
∣∣∣φ0,b〉
A1B1
∣∣∣φ0,−a〉
A2B2
|ψ〉C .
Note that VAVB and A1B1 are entangled as a result of the controlled-X operation. Nevertheless,
Alice and Bob still extract the correct error syndrome when they measure A1, A2 and B1, B2,
respectively, and compare their measurement outcomes, as if Bob’s QVC decoding operations were
performed before Alice’s (c-X)VAA1 operation. This is due to the fact that the error on the message
register is reflected in the MES pair as phase errors and the phase error in each MES can still be
detected correctly by local measurements in the Fourier basis even after the controlled-X operation
is applied. In the out-of-sync quantum hashing scenario described above a similar effect occurs.
Finally, note that when Alice and Bob do not agree on the number of MES blocks they have used,
they do not compare their quantum hash values unless a transmission error or a meta data hash
collision occurs.
4.3.5 First representation of the joint quantum state
As in Section 3.3, we start by introducing a first representation of the joint state, denoted JS1, which
in turn is simplified into a more informative representation. This latter representation, denoted
JS2, is the representation which Alice and Bob need to compute correctly in order to make progress
in simulation of the input protocol Π and decide their next action in Π′. Recall that due to the
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recycling of MESs, each block of MES pairs may be used multiple times to encrypt messages using
QVC. The representations JS1 and JS2 defined below are valid only if the recycling has been
successful so far in Π′, namely that Alice and Bob have recycled the same blocks of MES registers
and that these registers were indeed in the
∣∣φ0,0〉 state when recycled. We prove that except with
probability 2−Θ(n) the recycling is successful throughout the algorithm.
Recall that in the adversarial noise model, the adversary Eve can introduce arbitrary errors on the
quantum communication register C ′ that passes through her hand subject to the constraints given
by Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). Furthermore, as explained in Section 4.3.3, the algorithm is designed so
that once the two parties agree on the number of blocks of MES pairs they have used, the error in
the joint state due to out-of-sync QVC in any iteration is translated to a transmission error on the
message registers, as if the MES blocks were used in sync and transmission errors were introduced
by the adversary. We emphasize that in both cases, the error on the message register is a mixture
of linear combinations of Pauli errors and once Alice and Bob measure a block of MES pairs to
extract (part of) the syndrome, the error on the corresponding message register collapses to a Pauli
error. Then the joint state can be written in terms of a new mixture of linear combinations of Pauli
errors conditioned on the measurement outcomes, which are recorded in the Pauli data by the two
parties. To simplify the joint state representation and the analysis of the algorithm, without loss of
generality, we focus on a fixed but arbitrary error syndrome in any such linear combination of Pauli
errors arising in the simulation protocol Π′. We prove the correctness of the algorithm for any such
error syndrome which by linearity implies the correctness of the algorithm against any adversary
defined in Section 2.1.2. Let E ∈ Pd,n′ be a Pauli error with wt (E) ≤ n′. In the remainder of this
section, we assume E is the error introduced by the adversary into the n′ communicated qudits in
Π′.
We first define the representations JS1 and JS2 after i iterations of the algorithm in the case
when the two parties have used the same number of blocks of MES pairs, i.e., `AQVC = `BQVC. In
Subsection 4.3.7, we explain how these representations are modified when Alice and Bob are out of
sync in the number of MES blocks they have used.
We sketch how to obtain JS1 from FullMA, FullMB, FullPA and FullPB, when the error syndrome is
given by W ∈ (Σ2)∗. Recall that when `AQVC = `BQVC, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the state of each MES register and the Pauli error on the message register in the corresponding
communication round. Therefore, in order to simplify the representations, without introducing any
ambiguity, we omit the MES registers from the representations JS1 and JS2. The first representation
JS1 of the joint state after i iterations (when `AQVC = `BQVC) is given by
JS1 = [∗`AQVC] · · · [∗2][∗1] |ψinit〉ABCER , (29)
where |ψinit〉ABCER is the initial state of the original input protocol Π and the content of each
bracket is described below. The j-th bracket corresponds to the j-th block of MES pairs which
have been used by both Alice and Bob and contains from right to left r iterations of the following:
Alice’s unitary operation -
Pauli error on Alice’s message -
Bob’s Pauli correction - Bob’s unitary operation -
Pauli error on Bob’s message -
Alice’s Pauli correction.
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Similar to the teleporation-based protocol, we allow for an additional unitary operation by Alice on
the far left when she implements a block of type −1. Using the same rules described in Section 3.3.6,
in each bracket, the block of unitary operations of the input protocol Π applied by Alice (if any)
and her block type (±1 or 0) can be computed from FullMA. Moreover, her Pauli corrections are
recorded in FullPA and the block of FullPA containing these Pauli corrections can be located using
FullMA. Recall that each block of FullPA may correspond to two different types of iterations: when
Alice measures a block of MES pairs to extract the error syndrome she concatenates FullPA with a
new block containing her measurement outcomes (with no Pauli corrections), whereas in iterations
in which she communicates using QVC, she may apply Pauli corrections in between and records
the Pauli corrections in FullPA. Therefore, FullMA may be used to distinguish these two different
types of blocks and locate the corresponding Pauli corrections in FullPA. Similarly, in each bracket,
the block of unitary operations of Π applied by Bob, his block type and his Pauli corrections are
obtained from FullMB and FullPB. Finally, in JS1, the Pauli errors on the messages in each bracket
are specified in terms of the error syndrome W = W1W2 . . .W`AQVC ∈
(
Σ2
)2r×`AQVC defined below.
The communication in each iteration of the algorithm has two parts. In the first part, the parties
use a constant number of rounds to communicate the pointers and hash values. Any transmission
error introduced by the adversary on these messages only affects the actions of the two parties in the
current and future iterations, which will be recorded in the metadata and Pauli data and reflected
in the joint state representation. The second part involves 2r rounds of communication, in which
either classical information is communicated (e.g., to reconcile inconsistencies in the data structures)
or QVC is used to communicate quantum information (on one side or both). Transmission errors on
these messages can directly modify the joint state and need to be separately taken into account in
the joint state representation. Let W ′ = W ′1W ′2 . . .W ′Rtotal denote the error syndrome corresponding
to the restriction of E to these messages over the Rtotal iterations of the algorithm, where each W ′j
is a string in
(
Σ2
)2r representing a Pauli error on 2r qudits. For every j ∈ [`AQVC], if the j-th block
of MES pairs has been used in sync on both sides, say in iteration j′, we let Wj = W ′j′ . Otherwise,
the j-th block of MES pairs has been used out of sync and we define Wj to be the error syndrome
arising on the message registers in the corresponding communication rounds due to the remedial
actions the parties take to recover from the out-of-sync QVC; see Section 4.3.3 for more details.
Each Wj ∈
(
Σ2
)2r specifies the 2r Pauli errors in the j-th bracket from the right.
Note that in order to compute the representation JS1, one needs to know FullMA, FullMB, FullPA,
FullPB and W . This information is not necessarily available to Alice and Bob at any point during
the simulation. In fact, We use the representation in order to analyze the progress in the simulation.
Alice and Bob compute their best guess for JS1 based on their estimate of each other’s classical
data. They only compute their estimates of JS1 when they believe that they have full knowledge of
each other’s metadata and Pauli data, fully agree on the recycling data, have used the same number
of MES blocks and have measured all blocks of MES pairs which were corrupted in communication
using QVC or due to out-of-sync QVC.
Alice’s estimate JS1A of JS1 is of the same form as in Equation (29), except she uses her best
guess of FullMB and FullPB in the above procedure. Moreover, the string W in JS1 is replaced by
WA = WA1 . . .WA`AQVC ∈
(
Σ2
)2r×`AQVC computed by Alice as follows. For every j ∈ [`AQVC],
• if RA [j] = S, then she sets WAj =
(
02
)2r. Recall that when Alice computes JS1A, she believes
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that they have used the same number of MES blocks and have both already measured all
blocks of MES pairs which were corrupted in communication using QVC. Therefore, in Alice’s
view the remaining rounds of communication using QVC have not been corrupted.
• Otherwise, RA [j] = R˜B [j] = M, i.e., Alice has measured the corresponding block of MES
pairs and believes Bob has measured them as well. Using FullMA and M˜B, Alice locates
the corresponding measurement outcomes in FullPA and P˜B and sets WAj to be the error
syndrome obtained from the measurement outcomes.
Note that if Alice computes JS1A in an iteration with no transmission errors or hash collisions, then
the computed representation JS1A is indeed equal to JS1. Bob computes JS1B similarly based on
his best estimate of FullMA and FullPA.
4.3.6 Second representation of the joint quantum state
The representation JS2 is obtained from JS1 as follows. In JS1, starting from the rightmost
bracket, we recursively try to cancel consecutive brackets if their contents correspond to inverse
of one another. Once no further such cancellation is possible, what we are left with is the JS2
representation, which is of the following form (when `AQVC = `BQVC):
JS2 = [#b] · · · [#1][Ugr · · ·U(g−1)r+2U(g−1)r+1] · · · [Ur · · ·U2U1] |ψinit〉ABCER , (30)
where g is the largest integer such that the concatenation of the first g brackets starting from the
right equals the sequence Ugr, . . . , U2, U1 of unitary operations of Π. As in Section 3.3, we refer
to these brackets as the “good” blocks, and the remaining b brackets which need to be actively
rewound are called the “bad” blocks.
Once the parties have synchronized their classical data (to the best of their knowledge) as described
earlier, they have all the information they need to compute their best guesses JS1A and JS1B of
JS1. Using the same procedure described above, from JS1A Alice computes her estimate JS2A of
JS2. Similarly, Bob computes JS2B from JS1B. Note that the two parties may have different views
of their joint state, based on which they decide how to further evolve the state in Π′. The rules by
which Alice and Bob decide their respective types (±1 or 0) for the next block in Π′, and which
blocks of unitary operations of Π (if any) are involved, are the same as the teleportation-based
protocol; see Section 3.3.6.
4.3.7 Representation of the joint state while out-of-sync
We now define the representations JS1 and JS2 in the case when `AQVC 6= `BQVC. Note that in this
case similar to the teleportation-based protocol, conditioned on the classical data with Alice and
Bob and a fixed error syndrome W ′ by the adversary, JS1 and JS2 represent a pure state. However,
in addition to the ABCER registers we need to include the MES blocks which have been used by
only one party. Let u def= |`AQVC − `BQVC|. For concreteness suppose that `AQVC > `BQVC. Then the
JS1 representation is of the following form:
JS1 = [∗`AQVC] · · · [∗`BQVC] · · · [∗2][∗1] |ψinit〉ABCER . (31)
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The content of the first `BQVC brackets from the right corresponding to the MES blocks which have
been used by both parties are obtained as described in Subsection 4.3.5. The leftmost u brackets,
correspond to the MES blocks which have been used only by Alice. We refer to these blocks as the
ugly blocks. These brackets contain Alice’s unitary operations from the input protocol Π, her Pauli
correction operations and QVC encoding and decoding operations, as well as all the MES registers
involved in these iterations which remain untouched on Bob’s side.
The representation JS2 is obtained from JS1 as follows: We denote by [@u] · · · [@1] the leftmost u
brackets corresponding to the ugly blocks. We use the procedure described in Subsection 4.3.6 on
the rightmost `BQVC brackets in JS1 to obtain JS2 of the following form:
JS2 = [@u] · · · [@1][#b] · · · [#1][Ugr · · ·U(g−1)r+2U(g−1)r+1] · · · [Ur · · ·U2U1] |ψinit〉ABCER , (32)
for some non-negative integers g and b, which we refer to as the number of good blocks and the
number of bad blocks in JS2 representation, respectively. We point out that Alice and Bob do
not compute their estimates of JS1 and JS2 unless, based on their view of the simulation so far,
they believe that they have used the same number of MES blocks. Therefore, whenever computed,
JS1A, JS1B and JS2A, JS2B are always of the forms described in Subsections 4.3.5 and 4.3.6,
respectively. Note that Alice and Bob can realize that `AQVC 6= `BQVC by learning each other’s meta
data. Then if they do as described in Subsection 4.3.3, if no error or collision occurs, they will
reduce the number of ugly blocks in JS2 by one.
4.3.8 Constant collision probability for classical hashing suffices
As in the teleportation-based algorithm, in our algorithm in the plain model the hash function
of Lemma 2.5 is used to check for inconsistencies in the classical data maintained by Alice and
Bob. Recall that in Section 3, the collision probability p for the hash function h of Lemma 2.5 is
chosen to be 1/poly(n). The output of the hash function is of length o = Θ
(
log 1p
)
= Θ(logn) bits.
Therefore, in the large-alphabet case the hash values corresponding to the classical data can be
communicated using only a constant number of rounds. However, in the small-alphabet case, using
a logarithmic number of rounds to communicate the hash values leads to a vanishing simulation
rate. In our algorithm in this section, we use the hash family of Lemma 2.5 with a constant collision
probability and show that p = Θ (1) suffices to keep the number of hash collisions low. We address
this issue in the simpler large-alphabet setting to simplify the proof in the small-alphabet case at
the conceptual level.
Following Haeupler [Hae14], we circumvent the barrier explained above using the observation that
hashing only makes one-sided errors. In other words, collision only occurs when the data to be
compared are not equal, which in turn is a result of corruptions by the adversary. As the error
budget of the adversary is bounded by 2n, one would expect the total number of rounds in which
the classical data being compared are not equal to be bounded by Θ (n). In fact, this allows us to
have a constant collision probability while keeping the number of hash collisions in the same order
as the number of transmission errors.
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4.3.9 Summary of main steps
In Algorithm 12, we summarize the outline of the steps which are followed by Alice and Bob in
the simulation. Note that since synchronizing recycling data creates new Pauli data, we choose
to do this step before synchronizing the Pauli data. Similar to the teleportation-based case, the
algorithm is designed so that unless there is a transmission error or a hash collision in comparing a
given type of data, Alice and Bob will simultaneously go down these steps while never returning to
a previous step. This in fact is a crucial property used in the analysis of the algorithm.
Algorithm 12: Main steps in one iteration of the simulation for the large alphabet recycling-
based model
1 Agree on the history of the simulation contained in metadata, i.e., ensure FullMA = M˜A and
FullMB = M˜B. This involves Algorithm 5—rewindMD and Algorithm 6—extendMD.
2 Synchronize the number of MES blocks used in QVC, in particular, ensure `AQVC = `˜BQVC and
`BQVC = `˜AQVC. This is done via Algorithm 18—Q-syncMES.
3 Agree on the measurement pointers and the recycling data up to the pointers, in particular,
ensure (`RA,RA [1 : `RA]) =
(˜`RB, R˜B [1 : ˜`RB]) and
(`RB,RB [1 : `RB]) =
(˜`RA, R˜A [1 : ˜`RA]). This involves Algorithm 19—rewindRD.
4 Ensure no undetected quantum error from earlier rounds exists. This is done by ensuring
QHA = QHB and involves Algorithm 20—measuresyndrome.
5 Ensure `RA = `AQVC and `RB = `BQVC. This is achieved via Algorithm 21—extendRD.
6 Agree on Pauli data, in particular, ensure FullPA = P˜A and FullPB = P˜B. This is done via
Algorithm 22—Q-rewindPD and Algorithm 23—Q-extendPD.
7 Compute the best guess for JS1 and JS2. If there are any “bad” blocks in the guess for JS2,
reverse the last bad block of unitary operations. I.e., implement quantum rewinding so
that b = 0 in JS2. This is done in Algorithm 25—Q-simulate.
8 If no “bad” blocks remain, implement the next block of rounds of the original protocol. This
results in an increase in g in JS2, and is also done through Algorithm 25—Q-simulate.
Note that although in step 1 we use the same algorithms for synchronizing the metadata as in the
teleportation-based case (rewindMD and extendMD), the alphabet over which the metadata strings
are defined are now different (see Subsection 4.4.1). The algorithms mentioned in the remaining
step are presented in the next section. Figure 7 summarizes the main steps in flowchart form.
4.4 Algorithm
For each subroutine, we list all the global variables accessed by the subroutine as the Input at
the beginning of the subroutine. Whenever applicable, the relation between the variables when the
subroutine is called is stated as the Promise and the global variables which are modified by the
subroutine are listed as the Output.
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Figure 7: Flowchart of the recycling-based scheme for high rate noisy interactive quantum commu-
nication.
4.4.1 Data structure
Alice and Bob maintain a data structure obtained by modifying the one introduced in Section 3.4.1.
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• Metadata: The metadata now contain new symbols corresponding to recycling operations
and error detection measurements. In every iteration NewMetaA ∈ {±1, 0,C, 0ED,M,C′}
specifies Alice’s action in the current iteration. Similar to the teleportation-based algorithm,
in an iteration with NewMetaA = C, Alice does not access the quantum registers and if
NewMetaA ∈ {±1, 0}, then the unitary operators of the original protocol applied locally by
Alice in the current iteration have exponent NewMetaA. If NewMetaA = M Alice measures
the block of MES registers specified by her measurement pointer and moves the pointer back
by 1. NewMetaA = C′ corresponds to a classical iteration for Alice in which she just moves
her measurement pointer forward by 1. Finally, in an iteration with NewMetaA = 0ED, Alice
completes QVC on her side as explained in Section 4.3.3. The notation 0ED is used to emphasize
that similar to an iteration with NewMetaA = 0 no unitary operator of the original protocol
is applied by Alice, but she measures the block of MES registers at the end of the iteration
for error detection.
Alice records her metadata in FullMA which is concatenated with NewMetaA in each iteration
and has length i at the end of the i-th iteration. Similar to the teleportation-based algorithm,
Alice maintains a string M˜B as an estimate of Bob’s metadata, which is not necessarily full-
length. The length of M˜B is denoted by `M˜B. Alice also maintains `MA, her estimate for
the length of M˜A, which is with Bob. MA is defined as the prefix of FullMA of length `MA,
i.e., MA def= FullMA [1 : `MA]. When MA appears in any of the algorithms in this section, it
is implicitly computed by Alice from FullMA and `MA. We denote by `AQVC the number of
iterations in which Alice has performed QVC so far. Note that `AQVC can be computed from
FullMA and is equal to the number of ±1, 0, 0ED symbols in FullMA. Bob’s local metadata
variables are defined similarly.
• Recycling data: Quantum recycling data are used to decide whether a block of MES pairs
can be reused for communication using QVC. The recycling data alphabet consists of the
symbol M corresponding to a measured block of MES pairs and the symbol S, used for a block
of MES pairs still in superposition. Alice records her recycling data in a string RA, which is
also computable from FullMA. Alice maintains a queue, IndexA, of indices corresponding to
recycled MES blocks to be reused in QVC. In every iteration, NextMESIndexA holds the index
of the recycled MES block by Alice and the string IndexA is concatenated with the index. If no
such index exits in an iteration, it is assigned the value ⊥ and the protocol aborts. `NextMESA
is a pointer on RA and IndexA used by Alice in the recycling process. In every iteration, Alice
moves this pointer to the next S symbol in RA (if it exists) and records the value of IndexA
in this coordinate into NextMESIndexA. Alice also maintains a measurement pointer, `RA,
which specifies the block of MES pairs to be measured in iterations with NewMetaA = M.
The measurement pointers serve as reference points up to which Alice and Bob compare their
recycling data in each iteration. The pointer `RA can stay the same or move backward or
forward by 1 and can be computed from FullMA. In every iteration, if the protocol does not
abort, RA is concatenated with an S symbol corresponding to the recycled MES block and if
an MES block is measured the corresponding element of RA is changed from S to M. Bob’s
recycling data variables are defined similarly. Alice computes R˜B and ˜`RB as her estimate of
Bob’s RB and `RB, respectively, based on her full-length estimate M˜B of FullMB. Note that
if M˜B = FullMB then Alice’s estimates of Bob’s recycling data are correct.
• Pauli data: In any iteration, new Pauli data is generated on Alice’s side if and only if she
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measures a block of MES pairs or performs QVC locally. NewPauliA has three parts: If a block
of r MES pairs is measured locally by Alice in the current iteration then the measurement
outcome, (m1,m2) ∈ Σ4r, is recorded in the first two parts of NewPauliA, and the third part
contains ⊥2r, corresponding to no Pauli corrections. Otherwise, if Alice performs QVC then
⊥2r is recorded in each of the first two parts and the third part similar to the teleportation-based
protocol specifies the Pauli corrections.
Alice records her Pauli data in FullPA. Starting from the empty string, FullPA is concatenated
with NewPauliA whenever Alice measures an MES block or performs QVC. She maintains a
string P˜B as an estimate of Bob’s Pauli data. The length of P˜B is denoted by `P˜B. Alice
also maintains `PA, her estimate for the length of P˜A, which is with Bob. PA denotes the
prefix of FullPA of length `PA, i.e., PA
def= FullPA [1 : `PA]. When PA appears in any of the
algorithms in this section, it is implicitly computed by Alice from FullPA and `PA. We define
qMA
def= |FullPA| /6r. Note that qMA can be computed from FullMA. Alice computes her
estimate qM˜B of qMB using her full-length estimate M˜B of FullMB. Bob’s Pauli data variables
are defined similarly.
• As in Section 3, we use H with different variables as subscript to represent hash values, e.g.,
HMA represents a hash value corresponding to MA. We use QHA and QHB to represent
quantum hash values. The data variables with a superscript ′ denote the received data after
transmission over the noisy channel, e.g., `′MB denotes what Alice receives when Bob sends
`MB.
• The variable Itertype takes two new values: RD corresponding to recycling data synchronization
and QH corresponding to an iteration in which the received quantum hash value does not
match the locally computed quantum hash value.
Finally, LQVC denotes the total number of MES blocks to be used as the keys in QVC.
Remark 4.4. We point out an additional subtlety in interpreting the Pauli data by the two parties.
Recall that when Alice and Bob compute their estimates of the joint state, they use the metadata
to locate in the Pauli data, the measurement outcomes for each block of measured MES pairs.
However, due to transmission errors or collisions, it is possible to have an inconsistency between the
metadata and the Pauli data. For instance, M˜A may indicate that a specific block of P˜A contains
the measurement outcomes on an MES block, whereas it actually has ⊥2r in the first two parts and
corresponds to an iteration in which Alice has performed QVC. In any such scenario, Alice and
Bob interpret the ⊥ symbols as 0 and compute the joint state. This most likely introduces new
errors on the joint state from which Alice and Bob can recover once they obtain a correct view of
the simulation.
4.4.2 Pseudo-codes
This section contains the pseudo-codes for the main algorithm and the subroutines that each party
runs locally in the simulation protocol.
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Algorithm 13: Q-Main (Alice’s side)
Input: n round protocol Π in plain quantum model over polynomial-size alphabet Σ
1 Q-Initialization;
2 For i = 1→ Rtotal
3 Recycle;
4 if NextMESIndexA =⊥ then
5 Abort;
6 IndexA← (IndexA,NextMESIndexA);
7 RA← (RA,S);
B computing hash values
8 HMA ← hS4i−3 (MA);
9 HM˜B ← hS4i−2
(
M˜B
)
;
10 HPA ← hS4i−1 (PA);
11 HP˜B ← hS4i
(
P˜B
)
;
12 Quantum-hash;
13 Send (
HMA, `MA, HM˜B, `M˜B, HPA, `PA, HP˜B, `P˜B,QHA
)
;
14 Receive (
H ′
M˜A
, `′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
MB, H
′
P˜A
, `′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
PB,QHB′
)
;
15 Q-Preprocess; B Determining iteration type
16 if Itertype 6= SIM then
17 Send msg;
18 Receive msg′;
// messages are communicated alternately
B Case i.A
19 if Itertype = MD and RewindExtend = R then
20 rewindMD;
B Case i.B
21 else if Itertype = MD and RewindExtend = E then
22 extendMD;
B Case ii.A
23 else if Itertype = MES and NewMetaA = C then
24 return;
B Case ii.B
25 else if Itertype = MES and NewMetaA = 0ED then
26 Q-syncMES;
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Algorithm 13: Q-Main (Alice’s side, cont. from previous page)
27
B Case iii
28 else if Itertype = RD and RewindExtend = R then
29 rewindRD;
B Case iv
30 else if Itertype = QH then
31 measuresyndrome;
B Case v
32 else if Itertype = RD and RewindExtend = E then
33 extendRD;
B Case vi.A
34 else if Itertype = PD and RewindExtend = R then
35 rewindPD;
B Case vi.B
36 else if Itertype = PD and RewindExtend = E then
37 extendPD;
B Case vii
38 else
39 Q-Simulate;
40 return Q-Main;
Algorithm 14: Q-Preprocess (Alice’s side)
Input:  HMA, `MA, HM˜B, `M˜B, HPA, `PA, HP˜B, `P˜B,QHAH ′M˜A, `′M˜A, H ′MB, `′MB, H ′P˜A, `′P˜A, H ′PB, `′PB,QHB′
FullMA, `AQVC, M˜B,RA, `RA,FullPA, P˜B

Output:
(
Itertype,RewindExtend,NewMetaA,FullMA, `MA, ˜NewMetaB, M˜B, `M˜B,msg
)
1 if
(
HMA, HM˜B
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB
)
and `MA = `′M˜A = `M˜B = `
′
MB = i− 1 then
2 Compute `˜BQVC, R˜B, ˜`RB, qM˜B;
B Processing Metadata
B Case i.A
3 if
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B
)
6=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
, `′MB
)
then
4 Itertype ← MD;
5 RewindExtend ← R;
6 NewMetaA← C;
7 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
8 msg ← dummy message of length r;
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Algorithm 14: Q-Preprocess (Alice’s side, cont. from previous page)
B Case i.B
9 else if (`MA < i− 1) or
(
`M˜B < i− 1
)
then
10 Itertype ← MD;
11 RewindExtend ← E;
12 NewMetaA← C;
13 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
14 if `MA < i− 1 then
15 msg ← encodeMD (FullMA [`MA + 1, `MA + 2]); // Encode MD in Σr
16 else
17 msg ← dummy message of length r;
B Comparing number of used MES blocks
B Case ii.A
18 else if `AQVC > `˜BQVC then
19 Itertype ← MES;
20 NewMetaA← C;
21 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
22 `MA ← `MA + 1;
23 ˜NewMetaB ← 0ED;
24 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
25 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
26 msg ← dummy message of length r;
B Case ii.B
27 else if `AQVC < `˜BQVC then
28 Itertype ← MES;
29 NewMetaA← 0ED;
30 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
31 `MA ← `MA + 1;
32 ˜NewMetaB ← C;
33 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
34 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
35 msg ← dummy message of length r;
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Algorithm 14: Q-Preprocess (Alice’s side, cont. from previous page)
B Processing recycling data
B Case iii
36 else if (`RA,RA [1 : `RA]) 6=
(˜`RB, R˜B [1 : ˜`RB]) then
37 Itertype ← RD;
38 RewindExtend ← R;
39 if `RA > ˜`RB then
40 NewMetaA← M;
41 ˜NewMetaB ← C;
42 else if `RA < ˜`RB then
43 NewMetaA← C;
44 ˜NewMetaB ← M;
45 else
46 NewMetaA← M;
47 ˜NewMetaB ← M;
48 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
49 `MA ← `MA + 1;
50 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
51 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
52 msg ← dummy message of length r;
B Case iv
53 else if QHA 6= QHB′ then
54 Itertype ← QH;
55 NewMetaA← M;
56 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
57 `MA ← `MA + 1;
58 ˜NewMetaB ← M;
59 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
60 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
61 msg ← dummy message of length r;
B Case v
62 else if `RA < `AQVC then
63 Itertype ← RD;
64 RewindExtend ← E;
65 NewMetaA← C′;
66 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
67 `MA ← `MA + 1;
68 ˜NewMetaB ← C′;
69 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
70 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
71 msg ← dummy message of length r;
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Algorithm 14: Q-Preprocess (Alice’s side, cont. from previous page)
B Processing Pauli data
B Case vi.A
72 else if
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
6=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
then
73 Itertype ← PD;
74 RewindExtend ← R;
75 NewMetaA← C;
76 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
77 `MA ← `MA + 1;
78 ˜NewMetaB ← C;
79 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
80 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
81 msg ← dummy message of length r;
B Case vi.B
82 else if (`PA < 6qMA · r) or
(
`P˜B < 6qM˜B · r
)
then
83 Itertype ← PD;
84 RewindExtend ← E;
85 NewMetaA← C;
86 FullMA← (FullMA,NewMetaA);
87 `MA ← `MA + 1;
88 ˜NewMetaB ← C;
89 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
90 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
91 if `PA < 6qMA · r then
92 msg ← FullPA [`PA + 1, `PA + r]
B Case vii
93 else
94 Q-Computejointstate;
95 Itertype ← SIM;
96 FullMA = (FullMA,NewMetaA);
97 `MA ← `MA + 1;
98 M˜B ←
(
M˜B, ˜NewMetaB
)
;
99 `M˜B ← `M˜B + 1;
100 return Q-Preprocess;
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Algorithm 15: Q-Initialization (Alice’s side)
1 Initialize
LQVC ← Θ (n) ;
r ← Θ (1/√) ;
Rtotal ← dn/2r + Θ(n)e ;
t← Θ (n) ;
`MA, `M˜B, `PA, `P˜B, `
A
QVC, `RA, `NextMESA ← 0 ;
FullMA, M˜B,FullPA, P˜B ← ∅ ;
RA← (S, . . . ,S) of length t ;
IndexA← (LQVC − t+ 1, . . . ,LQVC) ;
// The indexing of the strings RA and IndexA starts from −t+ 1
2 h← hash function of Lemma 2.5 with p = Θ(1), o = Θ(1), s = Θ (logn) ;
3 Robust Entanglement Distribution(Θ (n
√
)) ;
4 Reserve LQVC · 4r MES pairs to be used as the keys in QVC ;
5 Reserve 10Rtotal MESs to be used in quantum hashing ;
6 Measure Θ (Rtotal) MESs in the computational basis and record the binary representation of
the outcomes in S1, . . . , S4Rtotal ;
// 4Rtotal seeds of length s for the hash function h
7 Measure the remaining Θ (n
√
) MESs in the computational basis and record the binary
representation of the outcomes in R′ ;
8 Extend R′ to a δ-biased pseudo-random string R = R1, . . . , R10Rtotal using the deterministic
algorithm of Lemma 2.10 where δ = 2−Θ(
n
r ) ;
// 10Rtotal seeds of length 4rt used in quantum hashing
9 return Q-Initialization;
Algorithm 16: Recycle (Alice’s side)
Input: (RA, IndexA, `NextMESA, i)
Output: (`NextMESA,NextMESIndexA)
1 if i ≤ LQVC then // No recycling in first LQVC iterations
2 NextMESIndexA← i ;
3 else
4 `NextMESA ← `NextMESA + 1 ;
5 while (`NextMESA < i) and (RA [`NextMESA] = M) do
6 `NextMESA ← `NextMESA + 1 ;
7 if `NextMESA = i then
8 NextMESIndexA←⊥ ;
9 else
10 NextMESIndexA← IndexA [`NextMESA] ;
11 return Recycle;
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Algorithm 17: Quantum-hash (Alice’s side)
Input: (RA, IndexA, i, R)
Output: QHA
1 QHA← ∅ ;
2 for k = 1→ 10 do
3 Choose a fresh MES from "Quantum Hash" category, and let F denote the register
containing Alice’s half of the state;
4 for j = 1→ 4r
(
t+ `AQVC − i
)
do // Hashing between blocks i− t+ 1 and `AQVC
5 if R10i+k [j] = 1 and RA
[
i− t+ d j4re
]
6= M then
6 Apply (c-X)FAb , where b = 4r · IndexA
[
i− t+ b j4rc
]
+ (j mod 4r);
7 Apply the Fourier transform operator on F , measure it in the computational basis and
record the outcome in qh;
8 QHA← (QHA, qh);
9 return Quantum-hash;
4.5 Analysis
To simplify the analysis of the algorithm, without loss of generality, we assume that the error
introduced by the adversary on the n′ message registers in Π′ is a Pauli error of weight at most n′.
We prove the correctness of the algorithm for any such error syndrome, which by linearity implies
the correctness of the algorithm against any adversary defined in Section 2.1.2. In order to track
the simulation progress and show the correctness of the algorithm, we condition on some view of
the local classical data recorded by Alice and Bob.
Similar to Section 3.5, the analysis of Algorithm 13 is in terms of potential functions which measure
the correctness of the two players’ views of what has happened so far in the simulation and quantify
the progress in reproducing the joint state of the input protocol. We recall the following definitions
from Section 3.5:
md+A
def= the length of the longest prefix where MA and M˜A agree; (33)
md+B
def= the length of the longest prefix where MB and M˜B agree; (34)
md−A
def= max{`MA, `M˜A} −md
+
A; (35)
md−B
def= max{`MB, `M˜B} −md
+
B ; (36)
pd+A
def= b1
r
× the length of the longest prefix where PA and P˜A agreec; (37)
pd+B
def= b1
r
× the length of the longest prefix where PB and P˜B agreec; (38)
pd−A
def= 1
r
max{`PA, `P˜A} − pd
+
A; (39)
pd−B
def= 1
r
max{`PB, `P˜B} − pd
+
B . (40)
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Algorithm 18: Q-syncMES (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
IndexA, `AQVC,msg′,FullPA
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , `
A
QVC < `˜
B
QVC
Output:
(
`AQVC,NewPauliA,FullPA
)
1 Let C0 be the communication register at the beginning of the current iteration (which is in
Alice’s possession) and for every j ∈ [r], let Cj denote the communication register
containing msg′(j), Bob’s j-th message in this iteration;
2 `AQVC ← `AQVC + 1;
3 Let E1E2 · · ·E4r be the registers with Alice containing halves of the 4r MESs in the block
indexed by IndexA
[
`AQVC
]
;
4 Apply
(c-Z)E2C0 (c-X)E1C0
5 For every j ∈ [r − 1], upon receiving Cj apply
(c-Z)E4j+2Cj (c-X)E4j+1Cj
(
c-X−1
)
E4j−1Cj
(
c-Z−1
)
E4jCj
6 Upon receiving Cr apply (
c-X−1
)
E4r−1Cr
(
c-Z−1
)
E4rCr
// See Section 4.3.3 for the rationale and Bob’s analogue of above steps
7 Apply the Fourier transform operator to E1, E2, · · · , E4r and measure them in the
computational basis. Store the measurement outcomes in (m1,m2) ∈ Σ4r;
8 RA
[
`AQVC
]
← M;
9 NewPauliA← (m1,m2,⊥2r);
10 FullPA← (FullPA,NewPauliA);
11 return Q-syncMES;
69
Algorithm 19: rewindRD (Alice’s side)
Input: (NewMetaA,RA, `RA, IndexA,FullPA)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B, `
A
QVC
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1, `˜BQVC
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , (`RA,RA [1 : `RA]) 6=
(˜`RB, R˜B [1 : ˜`RB])
Output: (NewPauliA,FullPA,RA, `RA)
1 if NewMetaA = M and RA [`RA] = S then
2 Sequentially apply the Fourier transform operator to all the MESs in the block indexed
by IndexA [`RA] and measure them in the computational basis ;
3 Store the measurement outcomes in (m1,m2) ∈ Σ4r;
4 NewPauliA← (m1,m2,⊥2r);
5 FullPA← (FullPA,NewPauliA);
6 RA [`RA]← M;
7 `RA ← `RA − 1;
8 return rewindRD;
Algorithm 20: measuresyndrome (Alice’s side)
Input: (RA, `RA, IndexA,FullPA)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B, `
A
QVC
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1, `˜BQVC
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , (`RA,RA [1 : `RA]) =
(˜`RB, R˜B [1 : ˜`RB]) , QHA 6= QHB′
Output: (NewPauliA,FullPA,RA, `RA)
1 if RA [`RA] = S then
2 Sequentially apply the Fourier transform operator to all the MESs in the block indexed
by IndexA [`RA] and measure them in the computational basis ;
3 Store the measurement outcomes in (m1,m2) ∈ Σ4r;
4 NewPauliA← (m1,m2,⊥2r);
5 FullPA← (FullPA,NewPauliA);
6 RA [`RA]← M;
7 `RA ← `RA − 1
8 return measuresyndrome;
Algorithm 21: extendRD (Alice’s side)
Input: `RA
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B, `
A
QVC
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1, `˜BQVC
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , (`RA,RA [1 : `RA]) =
(˜`RB, R˜B [1 : ˜`RB]) , QHA = QHB′ ,
`RA < `
A
QVC
Output: `RA
1 `RA ← `RA + 1;
2 return extendRD;
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Algorithm 22: Q-rewindPD (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
HPA, `PA, HP˜B, `P˜B, H
′
P˜A
, `′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
PB
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B, `
A
QVC
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1, `˜BQVC
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , (`RA,RA [1 : `RA]) =
(˜`RB, R˜B [1 : ˜`RB]) , QHA = QHB′ ,
`RA = `AQVC ,
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
6=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
.
Output:
(
`PA, `P˜B
)
1 if `PA 6= `′P˜A or `P˜B 6= `
′
PB then
2 if `PA > `′P˜A then
3 `PA ← `PA − r;
4 if `P˜B > `
′
PB then
5 `P˜B ← `P˜B − r;
6 else
7 if HPA 6= H ′P˜A then
8 `PA ← `PA − r;
9 if HP˜B 6= H ′PB then
10 `P˜B ← `P˜B − r;
11 return Q-rewindPD;
Algorithm 23: Q-extendPD (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
`PA, `P˜B, P˜B, qMA, qM˜B,msg
′
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B, `
A
QVC
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1, `˜BQVC
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , (`RA,RA [1 : `RA]) =
(˜`RB, R˜B [1 : ˜`RB]) , QHA = QHB′ ,
`RA = `AQVC ,
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
,
`PA < 6qMA · r or `P˜B < 6qM˜B · r.
Output:
(
`PA, P˜B, `P˜B
)
1 if `PA < 6qMA · r then
2 `PA ← `PA + r;
3 if `P˜B < 6qM˜B · r then
4 P˜B
[
`P˜B + 1 : `P˜B + r
]
← msg′;
5 `P˜B ← `P˜B + r;
6 return Q-extendPD;
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Algorithm 24: Q-computejointstate (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
FullMA, M˜B,RA,FullPA, P˜B
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B, `
A
QVC
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
, `′MB, `˜BQVC
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i− 1 , (`RA,RA [1 : `RA]) =
(˜`RB, R˜B [1 : ˜`RB]) , QHA = QHB′ ,
`RA = `AQVC ,
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
,
`PA = 6qMA · r , `P˜B = 6qM˜B · r,
Output:
(
JS1A, JS2A,NewMetaA, ˜NewMetaB,Block,RewindExtend,PCorr, P˜Corr
)
1 Compute JS1A;
2 Compute JS2A;
3 Compute NewMetaA;
4 Compute ˜NewMetaB;
5 Compute RewindExtend;
6 Compute Block;
7 Compute PCorr;
8 Compute P˜Corr;
// Refer to Sections 4.3.5, 4.3.6 to see how these variables are computed
9 return Q-computejointstate;
Algorithm 25: Q-simulate (Alice’s side)
Input:
(
`AQVC, IndexA,FullPA, `PA, P˜B, `P˜B,NewMetaA,RewindExtend,Block,PCorr, P˜Corr
)
Promise:
(
HMA, HM˜B, `MA, `M˜B, `
A
QVC
)
=
(
H ′
M˜A
, H ′MB, `
′
M˜A
+ 1, `′MB + 1, `˜BQVC
)
,
`MA = `M˜B = i , (`RA,RA [1 : `RA]) =
(˜`RB, R˜B [1 : ˜`RB]) , QHA = QHB′ ,
`RA = `AQVC ,
(
HPA, HP˜B, `PA, `P˜B
)
=
(
H ′
P˜A
, H ′PB, `
′
P˜A
, `′PB
)
,
`PA = 6qMA · r , `P˜B = 6qM˜B · r,
Output:
(
`AQVC,NewPauliA,FullPA, `PA, ˜NewPauliB, P˜B, `P˜B, `RA
)
1 `AQVC ← `AQVC + 1;
2 Continue the simulation of the noiseless protocol according to the output of
Q-computejointstate using the block of MESs indexed by IndexA
[
`AQVC
]
;
3 NewPauliA← (⊥2r,⊥2r,PCorr);
4 FullPA← (FullPA,NewPauliA);
5 `PA ← `PA + 6r;
6 ˜NewPauliB ←
(
⊥2r,⊥2r, P˜Corr
)
;
7 P˜B ←
(
P˜B, ˜NewPauliB
)
;
8 `P˜B ← `P˜B + 6r;
9 `RA ← `RA + 1;
10 return Q-simulate;
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We recall the definition of g, b, u from Subsection 4.3.7:
g
def= the number of good blocks in JS2, (41)
b
def= the number of bad blocks in JS2, and (42)
u
def= |`AQVC − `BQVC|, (43)
We define
rd+
def= max{j : j ≤ min{`RA, `RB} , RA [1 : j] = RB [1 : j]
,Wk = 04r for all k ≤ j with RA [k] = S}; (44)
rd− def= max{`RA, `RB} − rd+, (45)
whereW in Equation 44 is the string corresponding to the error syndrome defined in Subsection 4.3.5.
At the end of the i-th iteration, we let
ΦMD
def= 2i−md+A + 3md−A −md+B + 3md−B , (46)
ΦRD
def= `AQVC + `BQVC + 13rd− − 2rd+, (47)
ΦPD
def= 6qMA + 6qMB − pd+A + pd−A − pd+B + pd−B , (48)
ΦQ
def= g − b− 9u, (49)
Φ def= ΦQ − ΦMD − ΦRD − ΦPD. (50)
The following lemma states an important property of potential functions ΦMD, ΦRD and ΦPD
defined above which we use in the analysis of the algorithm.
Lemma 4.5. Throughout the algorithm, it holds that
• ΦMD ≥ 0 with equality if and only if Alice and Bob have full knowledge of each other’s metadata,
i.e., md+A = md
+
B = i and md
−
A = md
−
B = 0.
• ΦRD ≥ 0 with equality if and only if Alice and Bob have used the same number of MES blocks
(`AQVC = `BQVC), their measurement pointers `RA and `RB agree and are equal to `AQVC, they
fully agree on the recycling data (RA = RB) and Wk = 04r for all k ≤ `AQVC with RA [k] = S,
i.e., `AQVC = `BQVC = rd+ and rd− = 0.
• ΦPD ≥ 0 with equality if and only if Alice and Bob have full knowledge of each other’s Pauli
data, i.e., pd+A = 6qMA, pd
+
B = 6qMB and pd
−
A = pd
−
B = 0.
Proof. The first statement follows from the property that md−A,md
−
B ≥ 0 and md+A,md+B ≤ i. The
second statement holds since rd− ≥ 0, rd+ ≤ min{`RA, `RB} and the property that `RA ≤ `AQVC and
`RB ≤ `BQVC. The third statement follows since pd−A, pd−B ≥ 0, pd+A ≤ 6qMA , and pd+B ≤ 6qMB.
In order to avoid ambiguity, whenever necessary we use a superscript i to indicate the value of the
variables of the algorithm at the end of the i-th iteration. For instance, we denote Alice’s recycling
data at the end of the i-th iteration by RAi. Before presenting the analysis of Algorithm 13, we
formally define successful recycling.
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Definition 4.6. We say recycling is successful in the i-th iteration of Algorithm 13 if the following
hold:
• The algorithm does not abort in the i-th iteration, i.e., NextMESIndexAi,NextMESIndexBi 6=⊥,
• NextMESIndexAi = NextMESIndexBi,
• The block of MES registers indexed by NextMESIndexAi are in the ∣∣φ0,0〉⊗4r state at the
beginning of the i-th iteration.
Note that the conditions of Definition 4.6 are all satisfied in the first LQVC iterations of the algorithm,
since in fact no recycling is done in those iterations. Moreover, we have IndexA [1 : LQVC] =
IndexB [1 : LQVC] = 1 : LQVC.
Proof Outline of Theorem 4.1. In order to prove successful simulation of an n-round protocol,
it suffices to show that Φ ≥ n/2r, at the end of the simulation. In Section 3.5 we showed that
except with exponentially small probability, the total number of hash collisions is O (n). Then,
for sufficiently large number of iterations, to prove the correctness it was sufficient to show that in
any iteration with no error or hash collision the potential function increases by at least one, while
any iteration with errors or hash collisions decreases the potential by at most some fixed constant.
However, this statement is not necessarily true for Algorithm 13 if the recycling of MESs has not
been successful in an earlier iteration. In fact, the potential function is defined in terms of JS2
which is a valid representation of the joint state at any stage in the simulation only if recycling has
been successful so far. Therefore, to use such an argument, one needs to prove successful recycling
first. On the other hand, to prove successful recycling in an iteration, we need to bound the number
of iterations with a hash collision, as well as the number of iterations dedicated to “recovery” from
hash collisions and transmission errors. Therefore, the analysis of the recycling-based protocol
involves an inductive argument.
The analysis in this section involves constants
c1 < c2 < c3 < c4 < c5 < c6 < c7 < c8 < c9 ,
chosen such that ci is sufficiently large depending only on cj with j < i.
Definition 4.7. We say an iteration of Algorithm 13 suffers from a metadata hash collision when
HMA = HM˜A despite the fact that MA 6= M˜A, or HMB = HM˜B despite the fact that MB 6= M˜B.
Note that we distinguish between the above scenario and when, for instance, HMA = H ′M˜A due to a
transmission error on HM˜A, despite the two might have similar effects.
The following lemma bounds the number of iterations with a metadata hash collision up to any
point in the simulation assuming successful recycling in the earlier iterations.
Lemma 4.8. Suppose that recycling is successful in the first i iterations of Algorithm 13. Then
the number of iterations of the algorithm suffering from a metadata hash collision in the first i
iterations is at most c1n with probability at least 1− 2−Θ(n).
Proof. Note that a metadata hash collision occurs in an iteration only if md−A + md
−
B 6= 0 at the
beginning of the iteration. Let αMD denote the number of such iterations in the first i iterations of
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Algorithm 13. It suffices to prove that
Pr (αMD > c1n) ≤ 2−Θ(n) .
Note that in any iteration md−A + md
−
B increases by at most 6. Moreover, in an iteration with
md−A +md
−
B 6= 0, if md−A +md−B decreases, it decreases by at least 1. Therefore, in at least αMD/7
iterations,md−A+md
−
B increases or remains unchanged at a nonzero value. Note thatmd
−
A+md
−
B > 0
increases or remains unchanged only if a transmission error or a metadata hash collision occurs.
Moreover, when md−A +md
−
B increases from zero in an iteration, it is due to a transmission error.
The number of iterations is less than 2n. So the total number of iterations with transmission errors,
is at most 2n. This implies that in all the remaining iterations, i.e., at least αMD/7−2n iterations
a metadata hash collision occurs. Since the algorithm uses independent seeds in each iteration and
the probability of collision is chosen to be 0.1, the expected number of collisions is at most αMD/10.
If αMD > c1n for a sufficiently large c1, then the Chernoff bound implies that the probability of
having so many collisions is at most 2−Θ(n).
Definition 4.9. We refer to an iteration of Algorithm 13 as a recovery iteration of type I if at least
one of Alice or Bob conducts one of the cases i.A, i.B, ii.A, or ii.B.
We use the following lemma to bound the number of type I recovery iterations.
Lemma 4.10. Suppose that in the first i iterations of Algorithm 13, recycling is successful and the
number of iterations suffering from a metadata hash collision is at most c1n. Then the number of
type I recovery iterations in the first i iterations is at most c2n.
Proof. Let
ΦI
def= u+ ΦMD .
By Lemma 4.5 and the definition of u in Eq. (43), ΦI is always non-negative and is equal to zero
if and only if Alice and Bob know each other’s full metadata and have used the same number of
MES blocks for QVC.
Note that if ΦI = 0 at the beginning of an iteration, then the iteration is a type I recovery iteration
only if a transmission error in communication of metadata messages occurs. The total number of
such iterations is at most 2n.
Let βI denote the number of iterations in the first i iterations starting with ΦI > 0. Note that in any
iteration, ΦI increases or remains unchanged at a nonzero value only if a metadata hash collision or
a transmission error occurs. In each iteration, regardless of the number of errors and collisions, ΦI
increases by at most 23. Moreover, if ΦI decreases, it decreases by at least 1. Assuming the number
of metadata hash collisions is at most c1n, this implies that the number of iterations in which ΦI
decreases is at most 23 (c1 + 2)n. So we have βI ≤ 24 (c1 + 2)n.
Therefore, the total number of type I recovery iterations is at most c2n, where c2
def= 24 (c1 + 2) +
2.
Definition 4.11. We say an iteration of Algorithm 13 suffers from a quantum hash collision when
recycling has been successful so far, Alice and Bob know each other’s metadata, have used the
same number of MES blocks (`AQVC = `BQVC) and agree on their measurement pointers and their
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recycling data up to the measurement pointers (`RA = `RB and RA [1 : `RA] = RB [1 : `RB]) but
despite the fact that there is an undetected quantum error from earlier iterations, their quantum
hash values match, i.e., QHA = QHB. Note that we distinguish between the above scenario and
when QHA = QHB′ due to a transmission error on QHB.
We use the following lemma to bound the number of iterations suffering from a quantum hash
collision.
Lemma 4.12. Suppose that in the first i iterations of Algorithm 13 recycling is successful and the
number of iterations suffering from a metadata hash collision is at most c1n. Then the number
of iterations suffering from a quantum hash collision in the first i iterations is at most c3n with
probability at least 1− 2−Θ(n).
Proof. Note that a quantum hash collision occurs in an iteration only if rd− 6= 0 at the beginning of
the iteration. Let αRD denote the number of such iterations in the first i iterations of Algorithm 13.
It suffices to prove that
Pr (αRD > c3n) ≤ 2−Θ(n) .
Note that in any iteration rd− increases by at most 2. Moreover, in an iteration with rd− 6= 0, if
rd− decreases, it decreases by at least 1. Therefore, in at least αRD/3 iterations, rd− increases or
remains unchanged at a nonzero value. Note that rd− > 0 increases or remains unchanged only if
• A metadata hash collision or a transmission error on metadata messages (i.e., HMA, `MA, HMB,
`MB, HM˜B, `M˜B, HM˜A, `M˜A) occurs, or else,
• The iteration is a type I recovery iteration. Alice and Bob are still reconciling an earlier
inconsistency in their metadata and they are both in case i.A or case i.B, or one of them is in
case ii.A and the other one in case ii.B. Else,
• A transmission error on quantum hash values or a quantum hash collision occurs. At least one
party does not realize that rd− > 0 and conducts one of the cases v, vi.A, vi.B, or vii.
Moreover, the value of rd− increases from zero in an iteration only if
• A metadata hash collision occurs and Alice and Bob act based on incorrect estimates of each
other’s recycling data, or else,
• A transmission error on metadata messages occurs, or else,
• A transmission error on quantum hash values occurs and only one party conducts case iv, or
else,
• A transmission error on the Pauli data messages (i.e., HPA, `PA, HPB, `PB, HP˜B, `P˜B, HP˜A,
`P˜A) occurs and one party conducts case vi.A or vi.B while the other is in case vii. Else,
• A transmission error occurs on the communicated QVC messages when both parties conduct
case vii.
Assuming the number of metadata hash collisions is at most c1n, by Lemma 4.10, the total number
of type I recovery iterations is at most c2n. The total number of transmission errors is at most
2n. Therefore, in at least αRD/3− (c1 + c2 + 2)n iterations a quantum hash collision occurs.
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The shared random string used as the classical seed for quantum hashing is δ-biased with δ =
2−Θ(n
√
). By Lemma 2.10, the seeds are also δΘ(1)-statistically close to being Θ (Rtotal)-wise inde-
pendent. Therefore, all hashing steps are statistically close to being fully independent. Combined
with Lemma 4.3, this implies that the expected number of quantum hash collisions is at most
10−3αRD. For sufficiently large c3, if αRD > c3n, the Chernoff bound implies that the probability
of having at least αRD/3− (c1 + c2 + 2)n quantum hash collisions is at most 2−Θ(n).
Definition 4.13. We refer to an iteration of Algorithm 13 as a recovery iteration of type II if it is
not a type I recovery iteration and at least one of Alice or Bob conducts one of the cases iii, iv, or
v.
We use the following lemma to bound the number of type II recovery iterations.
Lemma 4.14. Suppose that in the first i iterations of Algorithm 13, recycling is successful, the
number of iterations suffering from a metadata hash collision is at most c1n and the number of
iterations suffering from a quantum hash collision is at most c3n. Then the total number of type
II recovery iterations in the first i iterations is at most c4n.
Proof. Note that by Lemma 4.5, ΦRD is always non-negative. If at the beginning of an iteration
ΦRD = 0, then the iteration is a type II recovery iteration only if
• ΦMD > 0 but due to a metadata hash collision or a transmission error on metadata messages
both Alice and Bob do not realize that. In this case they compute their estimates of each
other’s recycling data based on incorrect estimates of each other’s metadata.
• ΦMD = 0 but a transmission error in communication of quantum hashes occurs.
Therefore, in the first i iterations the total number of type II recovery iterations starting with
ΦRD = 0 is at most (c1 + 2)n.
Let βRD denote the number of iterations starting with ΦRD > 0 in the first i iterations. Assuming
successful recycling in the preceding iterations, ΦRD > 0 increases or remains unchanged in an
iteration only if
• The iteration is a type I recovery iteration, or else,
• ΦMD > 0 but due to a metadata hash collision or transmission errors on metadata messages,
Alice and Bob don’t realize that and act based on their incorrect estimates of each other’s
recycling data.
• ΦMD = 0, i.e., Alice and Bob have correct estimates of each other’s recycling data but a
quantum hash collision or a transmission error on quantum hash values occurs.
Moreover, ΦRD increases from zero in an iteration only if
• A transmission error occurs, or else,
• A metadata hash collision occurs and the two parties act based on incorrect estimates of each
other’s recycling data.
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Therefore, the number of iterations in the first i iterations with ΦRD increasing or remaining
unchanged at a nonzero value is at most (c1 + c2 + c3 + 2)n. Note that in each iteration, regardless
of the number of errors and collisions, ΦRD increases by at most 30. Moreover, if ΦRD decreases,
it decreases by at least 1. This implies that the number of iterations in which ΦRD decreases is at
most 30 (c1 + c2 + c3 + 2)n. So, we have βRD ≤ 31 (c1 + c2 + c3 + 2)n.
Therefore, the total number of recovery iterations of type II in the first i iterations is at most c4n,
where c4
def= 31 (c1 + c2 + c3 + 2) + (c1 + 2).
Definition 4.15. We say an iteration of Algorithm 13 suffers from a Pauli data hash collision
when recycling has been successful so far, Alice and Bob know each other’s metadata, agree on
the number of MES blocks they have used (`AQVC = `BQVC), agree on their recycling data, their
measurement pointers satisfy `RA = `RB = `AQVC, all the non-measured MES blocks are in the∣∣φ0,0〉⊗4r state and HPA = HP˜A despite the fact that PA 6= P˜A or HPB = HP˜B despite the fact that
PB 6= P˜B. Note that we distinguish between the above scenario and when for instance HPA = H ′P˜A
due to a transmission error on HP˜A.
We use the following lemma to bound the number of iterations suffering from a Pauli data hash
collision.
Lemma 4.16. Suppose that in the first i iterations of Algorithm 13, recycling is successful, the
number of iterations suffering from a metadata hash collision is at most c1n and the number of
iterations suffering from a quantum hash collision is at most c3n. Then the number of iterations
suffering from a Pauli data hash collision in the first i iterations is at most c5n with probability at
least 1− 2−Θ(n).
Proof. Note that a Pauli data hash collision occurs in an iteration only if pd−A + pd
−
B 6= 0 at the
beginning of the iteration. Let αPD denote the number of such iterations in the first i iterations of
Algorithm 13. We prove that
Pr (αPD > c5n) ≤ 2−Θ(n) .
Note that in any iteration pd−A + pd
−
B increases by at most 8. Moreover, in an iteration with
pd−A + pd
−
B 6= 0, if pd−A + pd−B decreases, it decreases by at least 1. Therefore, in at least αPD/9
iterations, pd−A+pd
−
B increases or remains unchanged at a nonzero value. Note that when pd
−
A+pd
−
B >
0 increases or remains unchanged in an iteration, it is due to one of the following reasons:
• The iteration is a type I recovery iteration, or else,
• The iteration is a type II recovery iteration, or else,
• A Pauli data hash collision or a transmission error on Pauli data messages (i.e., HPA, `PA,
HPB, `PB, HP˜B, `P˜B, HP˜A, `P˜A) occurs.
Moreover, pd−A + pd
−
B increases from zero in an iteration only if
• A metadata hash collision or transmission error on the metadata messages occurs, or else,
• A transmission error on the quantum hash values occurs, or else,
• A transmission error on the Pauli data messages occurs, or else,
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• Both parties conduct case vi.B and due to a transmission error, at least one of Alice or Bob
extends her/his estimate of the other party’s Pauli data incorrectly.
Assuming the number of iterations of Algorithm 13 suffering from a metadata hash collision is at
most c1n and the number of iterations suffering from a quantum hash collision is at most c3n, the
total number of type I and type II iterations is at most (c2 + c4)n. The number of transmission
errors is at most 2n. Therefore, in at least αPD/9 − (c1 + c2 + c4 + 2)n iterations a Pauli data
hash collision occurs.
Since the algorithm uses independent seeds in each iteration and the probability of a collision
is chosen to be 0.1, the expected number of Pauli data hash collisions is at most αPD/10. For
sufficiently large c5, if αPD > c5n, the Chernoff bound implies that the probability of having so
many Pauli data hash collisions in the first i iterations is at most 2−Θ(n).
Definition 4.17. We refer to an iteration of Algorithm 13 as a recovery iteration of type III if it
is not a type I or type II recovery iteration and at least one of Alice or Bob conducts one of the
cases vi.A or vi.B.
We use the following lemma to bound the number of type III recovery iterations.
Lemma 4.18. Suppose that in the first i iterations of Algorithm 13, recycling is successful and the
number of iterations suffering from metadata , quantum and Pauli data hash collisions is at most
c1n, c3n and c5n, respectively. Then the total number of type III recovery iterations in the first i
iterations is at most c6n.
Proof. Note that by Lemma 4.5, ΦPD is always non-negative and it is equal to zero if and only if
Alice and Bob have full knowledge of each other’s Pauli data. If at the beginning of an iteration
ΦPD = 0, then the iteration is a type III recovery iteration only if
• A transmission error occurs on the Pauli data messages, or else,
• A metadata hash collision or a transmission error on metadata messages occurs. In this case
at least one party incorrectly believes that his/her estimate of the other party’s Pauli data is
not full-length.
Therefore, in the first i iterations the total number of type II recovery iterations starting with
ΦPD = 0 is at most (c1 + 2)n.
Let βPD denote the number of iterations starting with ΦPD > 0 in the first i iterations. Note that
in any iterations ΦPD > 0 increases or remains unchanged only if
• The iteration is a type I recovery iteration, or else,
• The iteration is a type II recovery iteration, or else,
• A Pauli data hash collision or a transmission error on Pauli data messages occurs.
Moreover, ΦPD increases from zero in an iteration only if
• A metadata hash collision or transmission error on the metadata messages occurs, or else,
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• The iteration is a type I recovery iteration in which one party conducts case ii.A and the other
case ii.B, or else,
• A transmission error on the quantum hash values occurs, or else,
• The iteration is a type II recovery iteration in which both parties conduct case iii or both
conduct case iv, or else,
• A transmission error on the Pauli data messages occurs.
Therefore, the number of iterations in the first i iterations with ΦPD increasing or remaining
unchanged at a nonzero value is at most (c1 + c2 + c4 + c5 + 2)n. Note that in each iteration,
regardless of the number of errors and collisions, ΦPD increases by at most 22. Moreover, if ΦPD
decreases, it decreases by at least 1. This implies that the number of iterations in which ΦPD
decreases is at most 22 (c1 + c2 + c4 + c5 + 2)n. So, we have βPD ≤ 23 (c1 + c2 + c4 + c5 + 2)n.
Therefore, the total number of recovery iterations of type III in the first i iterations is at most c6n,
where c6
def= 23 (c1 + c2 + c4 + c5 + 2) + (c1 + 2).
Let ωi denote the number of iterations suffering from a transmission error or a hash collision in the
first i iterations, plus the number of recovery iterations of type I, II, or III, in the first i iterations.
Note that the bounds and probabilities in Lemmas 4.8–4.18 are all independent of the iteration
number i. As a corollary we have:
Corollary 4.19. There exist q = 2−Θ(n) and a constant c7 such that, for every i ∈ [Rtotal],
assuming successful recycling in the first i iterations of Algorithm 13, except with probability at
most q, we have ωi ≤ c7n.
The following lemma is the last ingredient we need to prove successful recycling in every iteration of
the simulation. Recall that RAi and RBi denote the recycling data of Alice and Bob, respectively,
at the end of the i-th iteration.
Lemma 4.20. Let t = c8n where c8 > 3c7. Then for every i ∈ [Rtotal] where i ≥ t, if recycling is
successful in the first i− 1 iterations and ωi−1 ≤ c7n, then:
1. RAi [1 : i− t] = RBi [1 : i− t], i.e., at the end of iteration i, the recycling data of Alice and
Bob agree in a prefix of length at least i− t.
2. RAi [1 : i− t] = RAi+1 [1 : i− t], i.e., the prefix of RA of length i− t does not get modified in
the next iteration. The same statement holds for RB.
3. For every k ∈ [i− t] such that RAi [k] = RBi [k] = S, we have Wk = 04r.
Proof. Part 1:
Toward contradiction, suppose that there exists t′ ∈ [t, i− 1] such that RAi [i− t′] 6= RBi [i− t′].
Without loss of generality, assume that RAi [i− t′] = M and RBi [i− t′] = S. Suppose that the last
time Alice’s measurement pointer `RA was equal to i − t′ was t2 iterations earlier, i.e., iteration
i− t2. In that iteration, `RA has distance t1 def= t′ − t2 from i− t2, the iteration number. Note that
the distance between the iteration number and `RA increases only in (some) recovery iterations and
it increases by at most 2: the distance remains the same if Alice is in case v or case vii. Otherwise,
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it increases by 1 if `RA does not move and increases by 2 when it moves back. This implies that in
the first i− t2 iterations, there have been at least t1/2 recovery iterations. In the t2 iterations after
that, there is an inconsistency in the recycling data which does not get resolved. In any of these
iterations one of the following holds:
• A metadata hash collision or a transmission error on metadata messages occurs, or else,
• The iteration is a type I recovery iteration and Alice and Bob are still trying to reconcile an
inconsistency in their metadata, or else,
• The iteration is a type II recovery iteration. In this case, no metadata transmission error or
collision occurs and the iteration is not a type I recovery iteration. So Alice and Bob know
each other’s recycling data and aware of the inconsistency, they are trying to resolve it.
Therefore, in the first i−1 iterations, the number of recovery iterations plus the number of iterations
suffering from a transmission error or a collision is at least
t1/2 + t2 − 1 ≥ t′/2− 1 ≥ t/2− 1 ≥ c82 n− 1 ,
contradicting ωi−1 ≤ c7n. Note that here we implicitly use the reasonable assumption that n is
at least a constant.
Part 2:
Suppose that recycling is successful in the first i− 1 iterations and ωi−1 ≤ c7n. Note that by the
same argument as in part 1, at the end of iteration i+ 1, the difference between the measurement
pointers and the iteration number is at most 2ωi−1 + 4 ≤ 2c7n+ 4 ≤ t. Therefore, the prefixes of
both RA and RB of length i− t do not get modified in the next iteration.
Part 3:
Note that the difference between the iteration number and `AQVC increases only in (some) recovery
iterations and it increases by at most 1: The difference remains the same if Alice is in case ii.B
or case vii. Otherwise, `AQVC remains unchanged and the distance increases by 1. The number of
recovery iterations in the first i iterations is at most ωi−1 + 1 < t. Therefore, at the end of the
i-th iteration we have min{`AQVC, `BQVC} > i − t. Toward contradiction, suppose that there exists
t′ ∈ [t, i− 1] such that RAi [i− t′] = RBi [i− t′] = S and Wi−t′ 6= 04r. This is due to one of the
following scenarios:
• The corresponding block of MES registers has been used by both parties for communication
using QVC, but in different iterations (out-of-sync QVC).
• It has been used in the same iteration by both parties for communication using QVC but
transmission errors have occurred on the messages.
In any case, suppose that the last time one of the pointers `AQVC or `BQVC was equal to i − t′ was
t2 iterations earlier, i.e., iteration i− t2 and without loss of generality, suppose that `AQVC is that
pointer. In iteration i − t2, the pointer `AQVC has distance t1 def= t′ − t2 from i − t2, the iteration
number. This implies that in the first i− t2 iterations, there have been at least t1 recovery iterations.
In the t2 iterations after that, the block of MES registers indexed by IndexA [i− t′] are not measured
by any of the parties. In any of these iterations one of the following holds:
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• A metadata hash collision or a transmission error on metadata messages occurs, or else,
• The iteration is a type I recovery iteration and Alice and Bob are still trying to reconcile an
inconsistency in their metadata, or else,
• A quantum hash collision or a transmission error on quantum hash values occurs, or else,
• The iteration is a type II recovery iteration. In this case, no metadata transmission error or
collision occurs and the iteration is not a type I recovery iteration. So Alice and Bob know
each other’s recycling data. So Alice and Bob are both be in case iii or both in case iv.
The above argument implies that in the first i− 1 iterations, the number of recovery iterations plus
the number of iterations suffering from a transmission error or a collision is at least
t1 + t2 − 1 = t′ − 1 ≥ t− 1 ≥ c8n− 1 ,
contradicting ωi−1 ≤ c7n.
We are now ready to prove that except with exponentially small probability recycling is successful
in every iteration of the algorithm. Recall that we denote Alice’s recycling pointer at the end of
iteration i by `iNextMESA. We use mAi to denote the number of M symbols in RAi
[
1 : `iNextMESA
]
.
Similarly, `iNextMESB denotes Bob’s recycling pointer at the end of iteration i and the number of M
symbols in RBi
[
1 : `iNextMESB
]
is denoted by mBi .
Lemma 4.21. Let LQVC = c9n, where c9 > c7 + c8. Then with probability at least 1 − 2−Θ(n),
recycling is successful throughout the execution of Algorithm 13.
Proof. The proof is based on induction on the iteration number. Note that recycling starts from
iteration LQVC + 1.
Base case (i = LQVC+1): Note that the conditions of Definition 4.6 are satisfied in the first LQVC it-
erations of the algorithm and we have IndexA [1 : LQVC] = IndexB [1 : LQVC] = 1 : LQVC. Therefore,
by Corollary 4.19, except with probability at most q = 2−Θ(n), we have ωLQVC ≤ c7n. Assum-
ing ωLQVC ≤ c7n, by Lemma 4.20, RALQVC+1 [1 : LQVC + 1− t] = RBLQVC+1 [1 : LQVC + 1− t] and
for every k ∈ [LQVC + 1− t] such that RALQVC+1 [k] = RBLQVC+1 [k] = S, we have Wk = 04r. Note
that the number of M symbols in RALQVC+1 [1 : LQVC + 1− t] and RBLQVC+1 [1 : LQVC + 1− t] is
at most the number of type I and type II recovery iterations so far, hence at most ωLQVC+1 ≤
ωLQVC + 1 ≤ c7n + 1 < LQVC + 1 − t. Therefore, after running the Recycle subroutine, the algo-
rithm does not abort and at the end of iteration LQVC + 1, the recycling pointers are equal, i.e.,
`
LQVC+1
NextMESA = `
LQVC+1
NextMESB. Together with the fact that IndexA [1 : LQVC] = IndexB [1 : LQVC], this
implies that the conditions of Definition 4.6 are satisfied. Therefore, there exists an event E of
probability at most q = 2−Θ(n) such that if ¬E then,
• recycling is successful in iteration LQVC + 1,
• `LQVC+1NextMESA = `
LQVC+1
NextMESB, and
• `LQVC+1NextMESA = mALQVC+1 + 1 and `
LQVC+1
NextMESB = mBLQVC+1 + 1.
For LQVC < i ≤ Rtotal, let Ti be the following statement in terms of the iteration number i:
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• Recycling is successful in the first i iterations of the algorithm,
• `iNextMESA = `iNextMESB, i.e., the recycling pointers are equal at the end of iteration i, and
• `iNextMESA = mAi + i− LQVC and `iNextMESB = mBi + i− LQVC.
Induction hypothesis: For LQVC < i ≤ Rtotal, there exists an event Ei of probability at
most (i− LQVC) · q such that if ¬Ei then Ti holds.
Inductive step: Assuming ¬Ei, by Corollary 4.19, except with probability at most q = 2−Θ(n),
we have ωi ≤ c7n. Let E′ be the event that ωi > c7n. Note that Pr (E′|¬Ei) ≤ q. Suppose further
that ¬E′. Since `iNextMESA = mAi + i− LQVC, we have
i− t− `iNextMESA = LQVC − t−mAi ≥ LQVC − t− ωi ≥ Ω(n).
Therefore, by induction hypothesis, we also have i − t − `iNextMESB ≥ Ω(n). By part 1 of
Lemma 4.20, we have RAi+1 [1 : i+ 1− t] = RBi+1 [1 : i+ 1− t]. Since ωi−1 ≤ ωi ≤ c7n, by part
2 of Lemma 4.20, we have RAi+1 [1 : i− t] = RAi [1 : i− t] and RBi+1 [1 : i− t] = RBi [1 : i− t].
Therefore, the algorithm does not abort in iteration i + 1 and we have `i+1NextMESA = `
i+1
NextMESB.
Moreover, `i+1NextMESA = mAi+1 + (i+ 1)− LQVC and `i+1NextMESB = mBi+1 + (i+ 1)− LQVC. Note that
since recycling is successful in the first i iterations, at the beginning of iteration i + 1, we have
IndexA = IndexB. So NextMESIndexAi+1 = NextMESIndexBi+1 6=⊥, i.e., the first and second
conditions of Definition 4.6 are satisfied for iteration i+ 1.
By part 3 of Lemma 4.20, for every k ∈ [i+ 1− t] such that RAi+1 [k] = RBi+1 [k] = S, we have
Wk = 04r. Note that in the strings IndexA and IndexB, while each index in [LQVC] may appear
several times before the recycling pointers, it can only appear at most once after these pointers.
Therefore, the block of MES registers indexed by NextMESIndexAi+1 is indeed in the
∣∣φ0,0〉⊗4r
state when it is recycled in iteration i+ 1 and the third condition of Definition 4.6 is also satisfied.
For Ei+1
def= Ei ∨ E′, we have
Pr (Ei+1) ≤ Pr (Ei) + Pr
(
E′|¬Ei
) ≤ (i− LQVC) · q + q = (i+ 1− LQVC) · q .
By the above argument, if ¬Ei+1 then Ti+1 holds. Note that for LQVC < i ≤ Rtotal, we have
(i− LQVC) · q = 2−Θ(n) .
Lemma 4.22. Assuming successful recycling throughout the execution of Algorithm 13, each it-
eration with no transmission error or hash collision increases the potential function Φ defined in
Equation (50) by at least 1.
Proof. Note that in an iteration with no error or hash collision Alice and Bob agree on the iteration
type. Moreover, if Itertype = MD,RD or PD, they also agree on whether they extend or rewind
the data and if Itertype = MES (Case ii), then exactly one of them is in sub-case A and the other
one in sub-case B. We analyze the potential function in each case keeping in mind the hierarchy of
the cases; e.g., Case ii or later cases are encountered only if Alice and Bob have full knowledge of
each other’s metadata. Lemma 4.5 guarantees that ΦMD = 0 on entering Case ii, ΦMD = ΦRD = 0
on entering Case vi and ΦMD = ΦRD = ΦPD = 0 on entering Case vii.
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• Alice and Bob are in Case i.A:
– ΦRD, ΦPD and ΦQ stay the same.
– i increases by 1.
– md+A and md
+
B stay the same.
– None of md−A and md
−
B increases and at least one decreases by 1.
Therefore, ΦMD decreases by at least 3− 2 = 1 and Φ increases by at least 1.
• Alice and Bob are in Case i.B:
– ΦRD, ΦPD and ΦQ stay the same.
– i increases by 1.
– md−A and md
−
B stay at 0.
– At least one of `MA or `MB is smaller than i− 1; If only `MA < i− 1, then md+A increases
by 2, and md+B by 1. The case where only `MB < i− 1 is similar. If both are smaller than
i− 1, then md+A and md+B both increase by 2.
Therefore, ΦMD decreases by at least 3− 2 = 1 and Φ increases by at least 1.
• Alice is in Case ii.A, Bob is in Case ii.B:
– ΦMD stays at 0.
– rd+ and rd− stay the same.
– `AQVC stays the same and `BQVC increases by 1.
– qMA stays the same and qMB increases by 1.
– pd+A, pd
−
A, pd
+
B , pd
−
B stay the same.
– g stays the same, b increases by at most 1 and u decreases by 1.
Therefore, ΦRD, ΦPD and ΦQ increase by 1, 6 and at least 8, respectively. So Φ increases by
at least 1.
• Alice is in Case ii.B, Bob is in Case ii.A: This case is similar to the one above.
• Alice and Bob are in Case iii:
– ΦMD stays at 0.
– rd+, `AQVC and `BQVC stay the same.
– rd− decreases by 1.
– pd+A, pd
−
A, pd
+
B , pd
−
B stay the same.
– None of qMA and qMB decreases. qMA increases by 1 if RA [`RA] = S. Similarly, qMB
increases by 1 if RB [`RB] = S.
– ΦQ stays the same.
Therefore, ΦRD decreases by 13 and ΦPD increases by at most 12. So Φ increases by at least 1.
• Alice and Bob are in Case iv:
– ΦMD stays at 0.
– rd+, `AQVC and `BQVC stay the same.
– rd− decreases by 1.
– pd+A, pd
−
A, pd
+
B , pd
−
B stay the same.
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– None of qMA and qMB decreases. qMA increases by 1 if RA [`RA] = S. Similarly, qMB
increases by 1 if RB [`RB] = S.
– ΦQ stays the same.
• Alice and Bob are in Case v:
– ΦMD stays at 0.
– rd− stays at 0 and rd+ increases by 1.
– `AQVC and `BQVC stay the same.
– ΦPD and ΦQ stay the same.
Therefore, ΦRD decreases by 2 and Φ increases by 2.
• Alice and Bob are in Case vi.A:
– ΦMD and ΦRD stay at 0.
– pd+A, pd
+
B , qMA, qMB stay the same.
– None of pd−A and pd
−
B increases and at least one decreases by 1.
– ΦQ stays the same.
Therefore, ΦPD decreases by at least 1. So Φ increases by at least 1.
• Alice and Bob are in Case vi.B:
– ΦMD and ΦRD stay at 0.
– qMA, qMB stay the same and pd−A, pd
−
B stay at 0.
– At least one of the following holds: `PA < 6qMA · r, in which case pd+A increases by
1 (otherwise it remains unchanged), or `PB < 6qMB · r, and then pd+B increases by 1
(otherwise it remains unchanged).
– ΦQ stays the same.
Therefore, ΦPD decreases by at least 1. So Φ increases by at least 1.
• Alice and Bob are in Case vii:
– ΦMD, ΦRD and ΦPD stay at 0.
– u stays at 0.
– If b 6= 0 then g stays the same and b decreases by 1, otherwise, b stays at 0 and g increases
by 1.
Therefore, ΦQ increases by 1 and so does Φ.
So assuming successful recycling throughout the execution of the algorithm, the potential function
Φ increases by at least 1 in every iteration with no transmission error or hash collision.
Lemma 4.23. Assuming successful recycling throughout the execution of Algorithm 13, each itera-
tion of the algorithm, regardless of the number of hash collisions and transmission errors, decreases
the potential function Φ by at most 85.
Proof. In any iteration, i increases by 1, while g, md+A, md
+
B , rd+, pd
+
A and pd
+
B decrease by at most
1; b, u, `AQVC, `BQVC, qMA and qMB increase by at most 1; md−A and md
−
B increase by at most 3; rd−
increases by at most 2; and pd−A and pd
−
B increase by at most 4. Hence, ΦMD, ΦRD, ΦPD increase
by at most 22, 30 and 22, respectively, and ΦQ decreases by at most 11. So in total, Φ decreases
by at most 85.
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Finally, we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1 (Restated). Consider any n-round alternating communication protocol Π in the
plain quantum model, communicating messages over a noiseless channel with an alphabet Σ of bit-
size Θ (logn). Algorithm 13 is a quantum coding scheme which given Π, simulates it with probability
at least 1− 2−Θ(n), over any fully adversarial error channel with alphabet Σ and error rate . The
simulation uses n (1 + Θ (
√
)) rounds of communication, and therefore achieves a communication
rate of 1−Θ (√).
Proof. Let Rtotal =
⌈
n
2r
⌉
+ 86 (c1 + c3 + c5 + 2)n. By Lemma 4.21, recycling is successful through-
out the execution of the algorithm with probability at least 1 − 2−Θ(n). Assuming successful
recycling, by Lemmas 4.8, 4.12 and 4.16, the total number of iterations with a hash collision is at
most c1 + c3 + c5 except with probability 2−Θ(n). Since the number of iterations is less than 2n, the
total number of iterations with a transmission error is at most 2n. Therefore, by Lemma 4.22, in
the remaining Rtotal − (c1 + c3 + c5 + 2)n iterations the potential function Φ increases by at least
1. The potential function decreases in an iteration only if a hash collision or a transmission error
occurs and by Lemma 4.23, it decreases by at most 85. So at the end of the simulation, we have
g − b− u ≥ ΦQ ≥ Φ ≥ Rtotal − (c1 + c3 + c5 + 2)n− 85 (c1 + c3 + c5 + 2)n ≥ n2r .
Therefore the simulation is successful. The cost of entanglement distribution is Θ (n
√
). Moreover,
the amount of communication in each iteration is independent of the iteration type and is always
(2r + Θ(1)): in every iteration each party sends Θ(1) symbols to communicate the hash values and
the value of the pointers in line 13 of Algorithm 13; each party sends another r symbols either in
line 17 of Algorithm 13, if Itertype 6= SIM or in Algorithm 25. Hence, we have
Total number of communicated qudits = Θ
(
n
√

)
+Rtotal · (2r + Θ(1))
= Θ
(
n
√

)
+
(⌈
n
2r + Θ (n)
⌉)
(2r + Θ(1))
= n
(
1 + Θ
(√

))
.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study efficient simulation of noiseless two-party interactive quantum communication
via low noise channels. For noise parameter , a lower bound of 1−Θ(√) on the communication
rate is proved in the plain quantum model with large communication alphabets. To achieve this goal,
we first study the teleportation-based model in which the parties have access to free entanglement
and the communication is over a noisy classical channel. In this model, we show the same lower
bound of 1 − Θ(√) in the large alphabet case. We adapt the framework developed for the
teleportation-based model to the plain quantum model in which the parties do not have access to
pre-shared entanglement and communicate over a noisy quantum channel. We show how quantum
Vernam cipher can be used in the interactive communication setting to efficiently recycle and reuse
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entanglement, allowing us to simulate any input protocol with an overhead of only 1 + Θ(
√
). In
an upcoming paper, we will show how the same communication rate can be achieved when the
communication alphabet is of constant size.
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